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LEGISLATIVE FOREWORD
Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the

Cost-Benefit State
Cass R. Sunstein*
In this article, Cass Sunstein explores the 104th Congress' attempts at regulatory reform. ProfessorSunstein believes that the election of this Congress,
with its distinctive approachto government, signals the dawning of a "constitutional moment" in which the role ofgovernment at all levels will be reexamined. Without full public supportfor sweeping changes in government, this
moment has not yet materialized. When and ifit does, regulatory reform will
be one of its aspects. Indeed the nation has already begun to examine regulation to determine ifthe benefits justify the costs. Unfortunately, the 104th Congress has, thus far,failed adequately to address this burgeoning cost-benefit
state. Sunstein claims that Congress'failurereflects its inability to redesign
the massive federal regulatory scheme. He suggests that the executive branch
should oversee regulatory reform, with Congress relegated to providingbroad
policy direction. Sunstein also suggests that Congress adopt an Administrative
Substance Act, building upon the recent learning about the performance of
regulation and modeled after the Administrative ProcedureAct. Sunsteinfurther callsfor the enactment of a "substantivesupermandate" requiringa general background rule of cost-benefit balancingfor all federal regulation; but
he contends that any description of costs and benefits should reflect the full
range of diverse values expressed by the public at large.
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LEGISLATIVE FOREWORD
I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

A Stalled ConstitutionalMoment

The 104th Congress promised to change the national government in fundamental ways. Spurred by widespread popular dissatisfaction with government,
the House of Representatives attempted to rethink national institutions more
deeply than at any time since the New Deal; in fact the New Deal itself was a
central target of the process of rethinking. America may be on the verge of a
constitutional moment in which Americans answer foundational questions in
novel ways.'

The election of the 104th Congress signalled the transformation of America
into a genuinely post-New Deal regulatory state. This emerging nation remains
in a process of development; but it may be described as a cost-benefit state, one
whose performance will be assessed, both in particular and in general, by comparing the costs of government action with its benefits. This idea requires a
good deal of specification, but it unites developments not only in the national
legislature, but in the executive branch, the judiciary, and state government as
2
well.
My purpose here is to evaluate the efforts of the 104th Congress to give
legal form to this constitutional moment. My particular interest is Congress'
effort to reform the modem regulatory state. Charged by a popular mandate for
reform and a high level of ambition, Congress debated both substantive and
procedural "supermandates" cutting across all federal regulation. 3 Thus the
104th Congress devoted a large part of its agenda to "rethinking the regulatory
state." The Contract With America also promised to address basic regulatory
issues. 4 In large-scale hearings, Congress examined problems of overregula1. I borrow the idea of a constitutional moment from Bruce Ackerman, who proposes a "dualist"
approach to constitutional interpretation-an approach that claims that America has witnessed two types
of decisions: foundational ones made by the American people and more ordinary ones made by their
representatives. 1 BRUCE AcKEImsAN, WE Ta PEOPLE: FoUNDATIONS 6 (1991). A constitutional moment is a period of popular development of principles that results in revolutionary reform. Id. at 21.
Ackerman identifies three such moments in American history: the Founding, Reconstruction, and the
New Deal. Id. at 58; see also text accompanying notes 16-34 infra.
2. Thus Executive Orders by Presidents Reagan and Clinton endorse cost-benefit analysis in some
form. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (mandating
that agencies assess the costs and benefits of a regulation before adopting it); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3
C.F.R. 323 (1986), repintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988) (requiring agencies to submit a plan of proposed
regulations annually) (revoked 1993); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (1988) (prohibiting regulatory action unless the potential benefits of the regulation outweigh its costs) (revoked 1993). On the role of cost-benefit balancing in the courts, see Motor Vehicles
Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 54-55 (1983) (endorsing cost-benefit analysis
for automobile safety standards regarding automatic seatbelt systems); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA,
947 F.2d 1201, 1215-17 (5th Cir. 1991) (rejecting EPA's ban on asbestos because EPA failed to adhere
to its statutory mandate to impose the least burdensome solution). On state and local government, see
TED GAEBLER & DAVID OSBORNE, REINVENTING GoVERNMENT: How Tm ENrmPRNmUIAL SPIRIT Is
TRANSFORnmiNo a PUBLIc SECTOR (1991) (advocating that government at all levels should be reformed
to behave more like the private sector).
3. See text accompanying notes 106-178 infra.
4. CONTRACT WITH AMEIucA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWr GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARmEY, AND

THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 131-35 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994)
(proposing to require federal agencies to prepare a risk assessment for each new regulation, an annual
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tion and the prospects for cost-benefit balancing.5 Finally, the House passed
and the Senate debated measures that, if enacted, would have represented the
largest changes to the Administrative Procedure Act6 since its enactment in
1946.
By the close of the first session, however, relatively little had happened.
There was no constitutional transformation for a simple reason: The public has
not (yet) called for one in the way that American institutions require. To be
sure, the House passed eleven major pieces of legislation in two monthsincluding the Congressional Accountability Act, 7 the Line Item Veto Act s and
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. 9 But only six of those measures were
enacted into law. The Balanced Budget Amendment 10 passed the House but
faced defeat in the Senate, as did tax legislation, welfare reform, a new crime
bill, and term limits legislation. The Line Item Veto Act and litigation reform
passed the House and Senate in different forms, but await the work of conference committees, stalled in the case of the line item veto by the Republicans'
reluctance to give this power to President Clinton."
All in all, there was a great deal of noise and bluster-a great deal of signalling-but surprisingly little in the way of concrete results. In the end, the
enacted measures proved modest and mostly procedural. The apparently more
ambitious proposals contained some good features. But many of their provisions were crude, unimaginative, and far more procedural than advertised.
Rather than reflecting new and better thinking about substantive regulation,
these provisions represented an effort to clog the administrative process with
paperwork. In fact, members of Congress sometimes appeared to misunderstand the content of the very legislation they were debating. Congress revealed
only a partial awareness of the recent outpouring of research on regulationresearch that could have produced the basis not only for fundamental change,
but also for a consensus cutting (more or less) across partisan lines. Congress'
report projecting the costs to the private sector of compliance with federal regulations, and a regulatory
impact analysis for each new rule, and promising to reform unfunded mandates, reduce regulatory
paperwork, and protect against regulatory abuses by agencies).
5. See, e.g., Reform of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration'sEnforcement Program: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1995) (statement of William Steinmetz Jr., National Roofing Contractors Association) (advocating less
regulation on small business); Hearingson H.R. 994, "The Regulatory Sunset and Review Act of.1995,"
Before the Subcomm. on National Economic Growth, NaturalResources and Regulatory Affairs of the
House Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Paul
Mashburn, Viking Builders) (calling for support of H.R. 994, which, among its provisions, provides for
cost-benefit analysis and review of all federal regulation).
6. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections

of 5 U.S.C.).
7. Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (1995) (making certain laws regarding, inter alia, employment
discrimination and fair labor standards applicable to Congress itself).
8. H.R. 2, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (authorizing the President to veto appropriations acts and
targeted tax benefits contained in revenue acts).
9. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (requiring special consideration of federal mandates that
impose a burden on the private sector or on state or local governments of more than $100 million).
10. H.R.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
11. Steve Daley, GOP Agenda Moves U.S. Toward a Turning Point, Cm. TRM., Aug. 13, 1995,
§ 1, at 1.
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emphasis on cost-benefit analysis showed a healthy appreciation for balancing
rather than absolutism; but it was only a start. Congress may well have laid the
groundwork for future developments. But because of its own institutional
weaknesses and the system of checks and balances-including above all bicameralism and the possibility of presidential veto-actual changes will take
more time. As a practical matter, these institutional weaknesses significantly
hamper Congress' ability to produce a constitutional moment in the context of
the modem regulatory state.
B. Lessons
Both institutional and substantive lessons will emerge from this article. On
the institutional side, I claim that Congress is quite ill-equipped to produce
sensible, constitution-like reform, at least if it tries to offer details. With respect to regulation, a group of generalist representatives-all with numerous
issues to address, few with particular expertise in regulatory law, and many
beholden to special interests-is not in a position to produce desirable, largescale reforms, unless it restricts itself to generalities. Such a group is prone to
sharp internal divisions that are not subject to reasonable mediation without a
good deal of specialization in regulation. Indeed, the task of producing constitution-like change in the modem state is far more difficult than it was in the
New Deal era. It is easier to create a regulatory state than it is to dismantle one,
especially in an era in which every industrialized nation is committed to controlling the operation of the marketplace.
These skeptical claims about Congress' institutional capacities are reinforced by recent experience. As we will see, the 104th Congress was split
between two different sets of interests: technocratic forces seeking to discipline
agency decisions with better policy analysis and forces of reaction seeking to
stop agency action even when it would improve social well-being. There is
thus an interesting contrast between the performances of Congress and the executive branch. Even those who reject President Clinton's approach to regulation should recognize that his administration has shown far more sophistication
and creativity in this area than Congress. 12 (The same is true for the adminis12. For example, Vice President Gore's task force, which is currently conducting the National
Performance Review, has produced a series of reports on "reinventing government.' See, e.g., BILL
CLINTON & AL GORE., REINvENTNr, WORKER SAFETY AND HEALTH (May 1995) (detailing reforms of
OSHA); BILt CLINTON & AL GoRE, REvENTINrG RGULATION OF DRuGs AND MEDICAL DEVICES
(April 1995) (detailing reforms of FDA); BILL CLINTON & At GORE, REINvENTING ENVIRONMENTAL

REGULATION (March 1995) (detailing reforms of EPA). See also Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859

(1995), reprintedas amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1995) (requiring agencies to make achieving environmental justice part of their missions); Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 2 (defining principles of
regulation including examining the effectiveness of existing regulation, encouraging flexibility in

method of compliance, and assigning costs and benefits of new regulations); Memorandum on Regulatory Reform, 31 WEEKt.Y Coam. PREs. Doc. 695, 695-96 (Apr. 21, 1995) (directing agencies to waive
penalties in certain cases and to reduce the frequency of required reports); Memorandum on Customer
Service, 31 WEEKLY CoM. PREs. Doc. 456, 456 (March 22, 1995) (directing agencies to implement
steps to ensure better customer service); Memorandum on Regulatory Reform, 31 WEmKLY Comp'. PREs.

Doc. 363, 364 (Mar. 4, 1995) (calling on agencies to cut obsolete regulations).
On March 16, 1995, President Clinton announced govermnentwide regulatory reform. White
House Office of Communications, PresidentAnnounces Governmentwide RegulatoryReforms, Mar. 16,
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trations of Presidents Reagan and Bush. 13) The executive branch has been
highly attuned to the need to compare costs and benefits, to attend to results
rather than processes, and to enlist the private sector in engineering least-cost
solutions. Improvements in regulatory performance are more likely to come
from the executive than from a Congress saddled with its institutional deficiencies. Perhaps Congress should give substantial discretion to administrators, allowing them to design appropriate regulatory tools and perhaps to set priorities
as well. 14 Indeed many current problems result from statutes that either produce poor incentives or forbid more imaginative, cheaper, and more effective
5
solutions-or that ban cost-benefit balancing altogether.'
On the substantive side, a cost-benefit state may well be better than what
we now have: a system containing both economic and democratic failures,
where priorities are not set carefully and where interest groups wield excessive
power over government. Certainly it is important to provide methods for assessing regulatory performance. At least in principle, some form of cost-benefit analysis could simultaneously promote political accountability and
regulatory efficiency. In this way, it could be part of a system of deliberative
democracy. But any movement toward a cost-benefit state should be accompanied by an understanding of the importance of public judgments in regulatory
law, the limits of the criterion of private willingness to pay, and the need to

1995 (press release), available in WESTLAW, Pres-Daily Database. The initiative to reform EPA will:
(1) simplify reporting burdens; (2) allow grace periods for small business violations; (3) provide incentives for self-disclosure and correction; (4) increase the use of emissions trading; (5) consolidate air
pollution rules; (6) give greater flexibility to recipients of grants; and (7) create a faster self-certification
program for minor changes to pesticides. Id. The initiative to reform OSHA will: (1) switch from
command-and-control to partnerships with business (which means negotiated, rather than dictated, regulations); (2) update obsolete and confusing standards; and (3) identify priorities sensibly (i.e., a ranking a
hazards in order of danger). White House Office of Communications, President and Vice President
Announce OSHA Reform. May 16, 1995 (press release), availablein WESTLAW, Pres-Daily Database.
See also Regulation: EPA, DOE,DOI Reform andEliminate Rules, GRE Nwm, Aug. 3, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Gmwre File (reporting Clinton administration announcement of reforms of
twenty-eight federal agencies).
In an important recent initiative, involving toxic pollution by refineries, the EPA concluded that the
benefits (at $150 million annually) would exceed the costs (at S95 million annually). Bruce Alpert, EPA
Issues New Rules on Refinery Pollution,N. ORLEANS TIMEs-PIcAYUNE, July 29, 1995, at A8. On another front, the National Performance Review report on the FDA, REINVanNG REGULATION OF DRUGS
AND MEDICAL DEvicEs, supra, called for exemptions of low-risk medical devices from premarket review; reducing or eliminating many approval requirements for drugs; excluding drug and biologic manufacturers from most environmental assessments; and spreading the marketing of medical devices by
charging use fees for reviews and also by committing FDA to meet performance standards. Id. at 4-5.
13. See Exec. Order No. 12,498, supra note 2; Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 2.
14. It follows that I reject the idea that Congress should closely limit agency discretion. See
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR How THE CLEAN Am ACT
BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAr.-OUT FOR HIGH SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD
BE DONE ABotrr IT 4-12 (1983) (defending the New Deal model); STEPHEN BREYER, BREArmNG TaE
Vicious CIRCLE: TowARD EFFECTivE RISK REGULATION 59-61, 64-68 (calling for the creation of a new
administrative group to oversee "risk regulation") (1992); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation:WhyAdministratorsShould Make PoliticalDecisions, IJ. L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985) ("[I]t may make sense to
imagine the delegation of political authority to administrators as a device for improving the responsiveness of government to the desires of the electorate.').
15. See text accompanying notes 49-58 infra.
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create market mechanisms that do not place excessive informational demands
on government.
More specifically, I suggest that a general requirement of cost-benefit analysis would indeed be a constitution-like amendment, and a highly undesirable
one, if it is understood in the most ambitious possible way: as an effort to
ensure that all regulatory statutes are implemented by reference to the principle
of economic efficiency based on the criterion of private willingness to pay.
Regulatory measures have diverse foundations, and many legitimate statutes
are not rooted in the efficiency criterion at all.
If cost-benefit analysis is understood more modestly as an effort to require
balancing rather than absolutism, it is a good idea and should generally be
required. But so understood, cost-benefit analysis can be specified in many
different ways. Congress should give appropriate guidance so that agencies can
make reasonable rather than unreasonable specifications. I offer some suggestions about how these tasks might be accomplished; to this end I emphasize
qualitative as well as quantitative factors, public judgments about risk, and the
highly diverse foundations of regulatory enactments.
This article comes in four parts. Part I examines the popular shift in the
perceived role of the national government-a shift that may yet culminate in a
constitutional moment. Part I also outlines what has been learned thus far
about regulation. Part II describes what the 104th Congress proposed and summarizes this failed constitutional moment. Part III explores how the principal
proposals might be improved. Part IV addresses the future of the cost-benefit
state.
II.

THE ATrACK ON THE

NEw

DEAL

A. A New ConstitutionalMoment?
The New Deal was of course a substantial reformation of the original constitutional structure. 16 It qualifies as a substantial reformation above all because
it refashioned the three basic cornerstones of that structure: federalism, checks
17
and balances, and individual rights.

In the 1930s the powers of the national government were expanded in an
extraordinary way, in favor of a system that exercised something close to general police powers.' 8 The original understanding of a sharply constrained cen16. See AcKERmAN, supra note 1,at 47-50, 105-130 (discussing the New Deal as the third American constitutional regime); Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV.
421, 423-25, 430-46 (1987) (discussing the substantial effects of the New Deal on previous constitutional understandings).
17. See TnaoDooE J. Lowi, THE END OF THE REPUBLICAN ERA 23 (1995) [hereinafter REPUBLICAN
ERA] (describing President Roosevelt's emphasis on populism and nationalism, rather than individualism); THEODORE J. Lowi, Tan PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PRONSE UNFULFILLED 52-58
(1985) hereinafter PERSONAL PREsmENT] (describing the New Deal shift in power from Congress to the
President by delegating significant discretion to federal agencies).

18. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 118-25 (1942) (interpreting Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce broadly to include the regulation of private activity that may indirectly affect
commerce); see also PERSONAL PRESIDENT supranote 17, at 49-50 (discussing the judicial ratification of
the government's expansive powers).
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tral government was therefore repudiated by the nation. There were simple
grounds for this repudiation. First, state autonomy seemed an obstacle to democratic self-government, not a crucial part of it-especially in the midst of the
Depression, when states were generally perceived as ineffectual entities buffeted by private factions. As a result of the New Deal, state autonomy was very
different in 1940 from what it had been in 1920.
Second, the system of checks and balances came under sharp criticism. To
many observers, especially during the Depression, that system seemed dysfunctional and anachronistic in modem society. 19 Effective businesses do not operate through checks and balances; why should government paralyze itself in this
way?20 In response, Congress delegated enormous policymaking power to the
President and created a large number of powerful executive and independent
agencies. 2 ' Crucially, Congress designed these agencies to limit the consequences of the system of checks and balances by allowing a high degree of
administrative autonomy. Thus the new agencies had a large degree of discretionary authority under open-ended statutory standards. They also combined
traditionally separated powers of adjudication, execution, and legislation.
These institutional shifts resulted from a critical national judgment made
during the Depression: that individual rights, properly conceived, included not
merely the common law catalogue of private interests, but also governmental
protection against many of the harms and risks of a market economy. These
harms and risks included unemployment, poverty, malnutrition, homelessness,
lack of education, and hopelessness as a result of disability. 22 Indeed the common law catalogue seemed overprotective as well as underprotective, for it was
unduly solicitous of private property. The common law was a regulatory system enjoying no special status; it should be evaluated pragmatically and in
terms of its consequences for the human beings subject to it. Here it often
seemed to fail. Hence the national government was authorized to engage in a
wide range of redistributive policies.
If the New Deal qualifies as a constitutional moment, it is because of its
revolutionary redefinition of constitutional commitments. 23 Indeed, an astonishing feature of the New Deal was its relative rapidity. Many changes came in
19. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADmISmmATrv PROCESS 1,46 (1935) (discussing the inadequacy
of the tripartite system).
20. See id. at 11.
21. See PERSONAL PRmSDENr, supra note 17, at 1-6 (documenting the expansion of executive
powers and creation of administrative agencies); CASs R. SumsTIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING =a REGULATORY STATE 18-24 (1990).
22. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 1944),
in 13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLn D. ROOSEVELT, VICrORY AND
THRESHOLD
OF PEACE, 1944-45, at 32, 41 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950).
23. I do not intend here to engage the debate over whether the New Deal actually qualifies as a
constitutional amendment. Compare AcsnEMA, supra note 1, with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text
and StructureSeriously: Reflections on Free-FormMethod in ConstitutionalInterpretation,108 HARv.
L. REv. 1221, 1299 (1995) (rejecting Ackerman's theory of higher lawmaking). In my view, the New
Deal should not be so understood. See CAss R. SunsmIN, New Deals, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 20, 1992, at
32 (reviewing ACKERMAN, supra note 1). The idea of a constitutional moment should, I think, be seen
as a metaphor, connoting large-scale change spurred by popular wishes, rather than as a genuine constitutional amendment. Nor do I intend to specify the criteria for deciding whether the nation has exper-
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the brief period from 1932 through 1936, and were clearly supported and ratified by the public. Such rapid change was possible partly because it is a relatively simple step for a legislature to create a range of new bureaucratic
institutions, at least if the legislature does not specify each agency's duties in
advance. In fact, the New Deal entities operated with little statutory guidance;
24
Congress usually contented itself with open-ended delegations of authority.
As we shall see, the relative simplicity of the New Dealers' task contrasts dramatically with the complexity of the task faced by the 104th Congress. 25 Moreover, in the early 1930s the public's support for the New Deal was broader and
deeper than public support for fundamental change in the 1990s-though the
public may unite behind such change before long.
The New Deal reformation served as the foundation for the basic orientation of the national government until the election of President Ronald Reagan.
One development during that period has been of special importance: the
"rights revolution" of the 1960s and 1970s, which reinforced many New Deal
tendencies through the creation of a remarkable array of new agencies. These
agencies were designed to protect against threats to life, health, and safety from
26
consumer products, workplaces, and, above all, to protect the environment.
Economic arguments about external harms reinforced claims for new statutory
"rights." Hence this period saw the creation of the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Consumer
Protect Safety Commission, the Council on Environmental Quality, and several
other administrative agencies.
It is notable that during both the New Deal and the rights revolution, no
mechanism was created to evaluate regulatory performance. No system assessed whether agencies were making things better or worse. In the New Deal,
any such system might have seemed peculiar in light of the widespread national
enthusiasm for the President and for the possibilities of benign administration.
In addition, cost-benefit thinking was largely foreign to political actors, and
hence cost-benefit analysis played little or no role in public debate. No mechanism existed to protect against the possibility that "government failure" would
replicate "market failure."
One of the most striking features of the period since 1980 has been sustained national criticism of the New Deal reformation. In light of the election
of the 104th Congress, this criticism may well be signalling the first genuinely
foundational challenge to American government since the New Deal itself. The
Contract with America clearly suggested that large-scale change was at issue.
It is worthwhile to pause over the constitution-like character of recent challenges to the current governmental structure. Critics often suggest that the naienced a constitutional moment. If the term is seen as a metaphor, rather than a legal term of art, it is
sufficient to work from more abstract and intuitive ideas of the sort described in the text.
24. See THEODORE J. Lowr, THE END OF LERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF
PuBLic Autorrry 132-33 (Ist ed. 1969) (describing the perceived need for broad authorizing statutes
as government expanded its powers).
25. See text accompanying notes 99-100 infra.
26. See SuNsTEnN, supra note 21, at 24-30.
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tional government has far exceeded the appropriate limits of its authority and
argue for a return to the original structure.2 7 Many assert that a devolution of
power to the states would promote both democratic and economic goals;2 s the
"block grants"
Unfunded Mandate Reform Act and Congress' recent interest2 in
9
criticism.
this
reflect
wish
they
as
basically
use
to
for states
In this way there is a wholesale attack on the existing allocation of authority
between the national government and the states. But "horizontal" issues of
government structure are receiving similar attention. Concerned about the extent of policymaking discretion given to regulatory agencies, many suggest that
Congress should reassert its constitutional prerogatives by narrowing administrative discretion. 30 It is urged that the New Deal's enthusiasm for independent
bureaucracy, and for a large lawmaking role for executive agencies, should be
revisited, and that Congress should make the fundamental choices of policy.
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, pre-New Deal principles of private right have enjoyed a rebirth with the suggestion that modem regulatory
programs violate liberty, rightly conceived. 31 These principles play a significant part in current debates, as reflected in arguments in favor of removing
constraints from the marketplace and imposing new compensation obligations
on government. 32 Thus the movement for deregulation has become far more
sweeping than it was in the Reagan period. The Takings Clause has become a
rallying cry for a new enthusiasm for the protection of private property-challenging such well-established federal programs as the Endangered Species Act
and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act's protection of wetlands.
Some criticisms of regulatory performance have been far narrower and
more pragmatic in character, focusing less on basic theory and more on the
economic consequences of regulation. It is here that cost-benefit balancing,
accompanied by risk analysis, has played a special role. As I have noted, the
New Deal period was accompanied by no mechanism for monitoring regulatory
performance. But it is now suggested that national government has failed to
perform the tasks assigned to it and has often made things worse. 33 In this
27. See CoNTRAcr WIrH AMERICA, supra note 4, at 125 (criticizing government efforts to legislate solutions to social problems); Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce Power, 73
VA. L. REv. 1387, 1388 (arguing that the Commerce Clause should not be used as a vehicle for expansive government powers).
28. See CoNrrcr WrrH AMERICA, supra note 4, at 73 (arguing for state-based welfare

programs).
29. See Welfare Reform Consolidation Act of 1995, H.R. 999, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995);
Local Government Law Enforcement Block Grants of 1995, H.R. 728, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995);
Welfare and Teenage Pregnancy Reduction Act, H.R. 513, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
30. See JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AD DistRusr: A THEORY OF JuDICIAL RvEw 131-34
(1980) (discussing the lack of accountability of administrative agencies); DAVID SCHOENROD, POwER
WITHoT REsPoNsIat.rY: How CoNGR.ss ABusEs rH PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 163-64 (1993)
(recommending a constitutional amendment prohibiting delegation of power to agencies).
31. See RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, SIMPLE RurLs FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 21 (1995) (asserting that
modem, complex laws "frustrate the very human talents and initiatives they are supposed to protect and
foster').
32. See text accompanying notes 127-128 infra (discussing the emphasis on property rights and
compensation requirements in current bills).
33. See generally Peter Linneman, The Effects of Consumer Safety Standard: The 1973 Mattress
Flammability Standard,in CHICAGO STUDrms IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 441 (George J. Stigler ed., 1988)
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view, there is no suggestion that markets are ideal; but often markets work
better than the regulatory programs designed as solutions. Increasingly, assess34
ment of regulatory performance has taken the form of cost-benefit analysis.
If we are indeed in the midst of a constitutional moment, it began with the
election of President Ronald Reagan and was spurred by the dramatic and
largely unanticipated shift in the direction and composition of the Congress in
the 1994 elections. The Contract With America presented the electorate with a
set of promises for fundamental reform. The importance of the Contract
should not be understated, for it helped to organize a formerly unruly House of
Representatives and provided public benchmarks against which the House
would be measured. It is clear that in the 104th Congress, the House of Representatives acted in a remarkably rapid and sweeping fashion, offering the Senate a chance to make the most significant changes in the national government
since the New Deal. The Senate declined the opportunity, largely because the
public showed its uncertainty about such far-reaching change. If the nation
follows the Senate's course, the effort at constitutional revision will have failed.
But any predictions on this count are premature. Let us turn, then, away from
theory and toward more pragmatic issues involving the performance of the regulatory state.
B. Post-New Deal LearningAbout Regulation
In the last decade, something very close to a consensus has emerged on
some of the most important problems in existing government regulation. If
government were to act on this consensus, it would introduce important
changes. Those changes need not amount to anything like a constitutional moment; here we are not speaking of the most basic constitutional commitments.
But the changes would be far from a mere matter of tinkering. The consensus
has the following features.
1. Government should engage in better priority-setting.
As we will see, measurement of costs and benefits can be highly controversial. But under any measure, there can be no doubt that resources for risk
reduction are badly allocated.3 5 As much as $500 billion may be spent each
year on regulation, 3 6 and of this amount, more than $130 billion is spent on
(claiming that the mattress flammability standard resulted in a substantial increase in costs, but no statistically significant increases in consumer safety); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of
Regualtion, in CHICAGO Srtmms N PoLmcAL EcoNoMY, supra, at 234 (explaining the problem of
diffuse interests that allows small groups to exert control over regulatory agencies); George J. Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, in CHICAGO STUins iN POLITICAL EcONoMY, supra,at 209 (arguing that regulatory agencies created to protect the public often succumb to interest group pressures).
34. E.g., Exec Order No. 12,866, supranote 2; Exec. Order No. 12,498, supranote 2; Exec. Order
No. 12,291, supra note 2.
35. See BRaYER, supra note 14, at 10-19 (arguing that frequently too many resources are spent to
eliminate small public health risks); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State 62 U. Cm. L. RE. 1, 4 (1995) (claiming that regulatory costs often exceed the benefits).
36. See Thomas D. Hopkins, The Costs of FederalRegulation,2 J. REG. & Soc. CoSTS 5,25 tbl. 2
(1992) (estimate of $400 million).
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environmental protection alone. 37 A recent study suggests that better allocation
of health expenditures could save 60,000 additional lives at no increased cost,
and that, alternatively, we could maintain the current number of lives saved
38
with $31 billion in annual savings.
39
This overall spending pattern includes serious and apparently unjustified
asymmetries in life-saving expenditures among the areas of regulation. For
example, compare transportation safety regulation, which costs a median of
$56,000 per life-year saved, to occupational safety regulation, costing a median
of $350,000 per life-year saved, and environmental regulation, costing a median of $4,200,000 per life-year saved. 40 These variations are compounded by
variations in the effectiveness of safety standards within each area. 41 Annual
lives saved are highly variable. In transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration's seat cushion flammability regulation saves thirty-seven lives each
year, while the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's passive restraints/belts regulation saves no fewer than 1,850 lives annually; in occupational safety, OSHA's hazard communication regulation saves 200 lives per
year, OSHA's oil and gas well service regulation saves fifty lives per year,
OSHA's grain dust regulation saves four lives per year, and OSHA's formaldehyde regulation saves 0.010 lives per year; and in environmental safety, EPA's
asbestos regulation saves ten lives each year, while EPA's land disposal regulation saves 2.5 lives per year. 42
Of course calculations of costs and benefits are somewhat speculative, and
these numbers are only estimates. But with better allocation of resources and
more deliberative judgments, much could be improved. Consider Table 1,
which certainly does not capture all relevant factors-it does not even describe
total benefits-but which is at least highly suggestive of poor resource
43
allocations.
In addition to this apparently inconsistent structure, the goal of achieving
sensible priority-setting is undermined by the fact that agencies have substantially different standards for deciding when risks are large enough to require
37. Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins, Regulatory Review of EnvironmentalPolicy: The Potential Role of Health-HealthAnalysis, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 111, 119 n.1 (1995).
38. HARvARD GROUP ON RISK MANAGEMENT REFORM, REFORM OF RISK REGULATION: ACIEVING
MORE PROTECTION AT Lass CosT 16 (1995) (citing Tammy 0. Tengs, Optimizing Societal Investments
in Preventing Premature Death (1994) (doctoral dissertation, Harvard School of Public Health)).
39. I use the word "apparently" because legitimate public judgments will support some disparities.
See text accompanying notes 74-88 infra.
40. Tammy 0. Tengs, Miriam E. Adams, Joseph S. Pliskin, Dana Gelb Safran, Joanna E. Siegel,
Milton C. Weinstein & John D. Graham, Five-HundredLife-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIs 369, 371 tbl. 1 (1995).
41. W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEoFFs: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSmILITIES FOR RISK 264
(1992).

42. Id.
43.

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BtDGET, BUDGEr OF THE UNITED STATES GovERNMmrr, Fis-

CAL YEAR 1992, pt. 2, at 370, tbl. C-2. This table does not prove that current allocations are inefficient
or even objectionable. To know whether there is cost-effectiveness, it is necessary to know more than
cost per life saved. It is necessary to know as well (at a minimum) cost per unit of benefit. Benefits
might include morbidity as well as mortality gains, improvements in recreation, mortality and morbidity
gains for plants and animals, and improvements in aesthetics. Table 1 does not include this information.
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TABLE 1
Summary of Cost-Effectiveness of Selected Regulations

Regulation

Agency

Unvented Space Heater Ban
Aircraft Cabin Fire Protection Standard
Auto Passive Restraint/Seat Belt Standards
Steering Column Protection Standard
Underground Construction Standards
Trihalomethane Drinking Water Standards
Aircraft Seat Cushion Flammability Standard
Alcohol and Drug Control Standards
Auto Fuel-System Integrity Standard
Standards for Servicing Auto Wheel Rims
Aircraft Floor Emergency Lighting Standard
Concrete & Masonry Construction Standards
Crane Suspended Personnel Platform Standard
Passive Restraints for Trucks & Buses (Proposed)
Side-Impact Standards for Autos (Dynamic)
Children's Sleepwear Flammability Ban
Auto Side Door Support Standards
Low-Altitude Windshear Equipment & Training Standards
Electrical Equipment Standards (Metal Mines)
Trenching and Excavation Standards
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance (TCAS) Systems
Hazard Communication Standard
Side-Impact Standards for Trucks, Buses, and MPVs (Proposed)
Grain Dust Explosion Prevention Standards
Rear Lap/Shoulder Belts for Autos
Standards for Radionuclides in Uranium Mines
Benzine NESHAP (Original: Fugitive Emissions)
Ethylene Dibromide Drinking Water Standard
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Coke By-products)
Asbestos Occupational Exposure Limit
Benzene Occupational Exposure Limit
Electrical Equipment Standards (Coal Mines)
Arsenic Emission Standards for Glass Plants
Ethylene Oxide Occupational Exposure Limit
Arsenic/Copper NESHAP
Hazardous Waste Listing for Petroleum Refining Sludge
Cover/Move Uranium Mill Tailings (Inactive Sites)
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Transfer Operations)
Cover/Move Uranium Mill Tailings (Active Sites)
Acrylonitrile Occupational Exposure Limit
Coke Ovens Occupational Exposure Limit
Lockout/Tagout
Asbestos Occupational Exposure Limit
Arsenic Occupational Exposure Limit
Asbestos Ban
Diethylstilbestrol (DES) Cattlefeed Ban
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Waste Operations)
1,2-Dichloropropane Drinking Water Standard
Hazardous Waste Land Disposal Ban (1st 3rd)
Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Standards (Proposed)
Formaldehyde Occupational Exposure Limit
Atrazine/Alachlor Drinking Water Standard
Hazardous Waste Listing for Wood Preserving Chemicals

CPSC
FAA
NHTSA
NHTSA
OSHA-S
EPA
FAA
FRA
NHTSA
OSHA-S
FAA
OSHA-S
OSHA-S
NHTSA
NHTSA
CPSC
NHTSA
FAA
MSHA
OSHA-S
FAA
OSHA-S
NHTSA
OSHA-S
NHTSA
EPA
EPA
EPA
EPA
OSHA-H
OSHA-H
MSHA
EPA
OSHA-H
EPA
EPA
EPA
EPA
EPA
OSHA-H
OSHA-H
OSHA-S
OSHA-H
OSHA-H
EPA
FDA
EPA
EPA
EPA
EPA
OSHA-H
EPA
EPA
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Cost per
Premature Death
Averted
($ Millions 1990)
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.6
0.6
0.7
0.7
0.8
0.8
0.8
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.5
1.6
2.2
2.8
3.2
3.4
3.4
5.7
6.1
8.3
8.9
9.2
13.5
20.5
23.0
27.6
31.7
32.9
45.0
51.5
63.5
70.9
74.0
106.9
110.7
124.8
168.2
653.0
4,190.4
19,107.0
86,201.8
92,069.7
5,700,000
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any regulation at all.44 For example, the International Commission on Radiological Protection recommends that environmental factors be regulated when
calculated to cause an incremental cancer risk of about 3 in 1000, for those
exposed over a lifetime. American agencies do not follow this recommendation, and national practices are highly variable. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission mandates regulation where incremental cancer risks exceed 1 in 1000;
the EPA does so when the risk exceeds an acceptable range that varies from 1
in 10,000 to 1 in 1,000,000. 4 5 The FDA set its standard at 1 in 1,000,000, but
courts have interpreted the Delaney Clause to require a standard of essentially
zero. 46 OSHA interprets the "significant risk" requirement in its governing
statute to mean that an incremental cancer risk of 1 in 1000 will initiate regulation;4 7 labor groups have sought to require regulation when the risk is 1 in
1,000,000. As we will see, a single number may not make sense in light of
different contextual judgments. 48 But in the face of these variations, good priority-setting is unlikely.
2.

Government shouldfavor flexible, market-based incentives rather
than rigid commands.

Too often government regulates through rigid commands, precluding industries from using more flexible and cost-effective measures that achieve the
same goals. 49 For example, in air and water pollution control, the rigid "best
available technology" approach,50 which mandates control technologies for
hundreds or even thousands of firms, gives industries little incentive to improve
existing pollution control technologies. Incentive-based systems could save
billions of dollars. 51 Yet in spite of the potential advantages, efforts to seek
better regulatory tools are hobbled by the statutory status quo, which either
forbids such tools or engrafts them onto a bureaucratically complex system. 52
44. See generally March Sadowitz & John D. Graham, A Survey of Residual Cancer Risks Permitted by Health, Safety and Environmental Policy, 6 RISK: HEMTH, SAFEvY & EtNviRoNmENT 17 (1995)
(documenting differences in agencies' standards for acceptable risk levels from hazardous substances).

45. Id. at 19-20.
46. Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1111-22 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the Delaney
Clause considers even de minimus risks of cancer unacceptable), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
47. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 614-15, 649-52 (identifying and describing the significant risk requirement).

48. See text accompanying notes 74-88 infra.
49. Cf Whitman Administration Report Urges Revamped Regulatory Procedures,St. Env't Daily
(3NA), Aug. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, Environ Library, BNASED File (summarizing New Jersey's

regulatory reform plan which advocates flexible standards and moves away from rigid command-andcontrol regulation).
50. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1988); Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 741 l(a)(1), 7412(d)(2), 7475(a)(4), 7502(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
51. See T.H. T mTENBERG,
EiMssiONs TRADINo 38-59 (1985) (estimating the potential savings
arising from emissions trading regulation); Paul R. Portney, Katherine N. Probst & Adam M. Finkel,
The EPA at "Thirtysomething,"21 ENrL. L. 1461, 1463-64 (1991) (noting savings of up to $3 million
through the system of marketable emissions allowances contained in the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990).
52. For example, the "offset" provisions of the nonattainment program of the Clean Air Act impose a "lowest achievable emissions rate" requirement in addition to the offsets. Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(I), 7501(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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A study based on data from 1984 suggests that the EPA's "netting" emissions
trading program saves between $525 million and $12 billion each year.5 3 The
Clinton Administration calculates that its market-oriented proposals for amending the Clean Water Act could save between $1 and $12 billion over alternative
approaches. 5 4 Thus studies show that incentive-based mechanisms for controlling air pollution could have accomplished the same result at one-quarter the
cost.

55

Encouraging companies to disclose information is an especially valuable
incentive-based approach to risk regulation. If companies offer information
about risk, consumer and worker behavior will probably be affected.5 6 The
national government has offered many initiatives in this direction. Consider in
particular the Toxic Release Inventory of the Superfund Amendments, which
requires companies to publish annual reports detailing the amount of toxics
they release into the environment. This program has been highly successful,
spurring voluntary reductions at relatively low costs. Reacting to public concern about the information in these mandatory disclosures, many companies
have voluntarily pledged to reduce toxic releases. 57 A great deal of work remains to be done in conceiving and designing appropriate informational ap58
proaches to risk.
3. Government should recognize and counteract harmful unintended
consequences of regulations.
Many regulatory initiatives result in harmful unintended consequences.
Under the existing regulatory system, there is no systematic way to ensure that
those consequences receive attention.5 9 Hence regulation tends to be based on
partial perspectives that emerge from close attention to mere pieces of complex
problems. This myopic approach ignores the importance of ensuring that regulation does not have unexplored side-effects or increase harms or risks on bal53. Robert W. Hahn and Gordon L. Hester, MarketablePermits:Lessonsfor Theory and Practice,
16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 374 tbl. 2 (1989). "Bubble" programs, combined state and federal, save an
additional S435 million per year. Id.
54. See 141 CONG. REc. H4690-4691 (1995) (debating Clinton's Clean Water Act proposals).
55. TiErENnBuR, supra note 51, at 44.
56. See Wesley A. Magat, W. Kip Viscusi & Joel Huber, Consumer Processingof Hazard Warning Information, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAeNTY 201, 230-31 (1988) (concluding that cognitive factors must
be considered when analyzing the rationality of risk-taking behavior); Pildes & Sunstein, supranote 35,
at 76-80 (explaining that perceived risks will affect individual behavior); V. Kerry Smith, William H.
Desvousges & John W. Payne, Do Risk Information ProgramsPromoteMitigating Behavior, 10 J. RiSK
& UNcERTAwNTY 203, 210-17 (1995).
57. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ALAN S. MILLER, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, & JAMEs D. LEAPE,
ENVIONMmENTAL REGrLATOn,4: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 624-27 (1992) (describing effectiveness of

information disclosure in attaining voluntary pollution reductions).
58. See WEst.E

A. MAGAT & W. Kip Viscust, INFORMAnONAL ApPROACHES TO REGULATION,

87-105 (1992) (examining consumer reaction to product risk information); Pildes & Sunstein, supra
note 35, at 19-22 (explaining that risk disclosure is important for the development of sound regulatory
policy); Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk Disclosure,and the FirstAmendment, 20 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 653, 655-58 (1993) (arguing that a participatory democracy is meaningful only if the public
possesses accurate information about risks).
59. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxesof the Regulatory State, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 407
(1990) (exploring some unintended consequences of several regulations).

HeinOnline -- 48 Stan. L. Rev. 261 1995-1996

STANFORD LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 48:247

ance. 60 A particular problem arises from "health-health" tradeoffs, which arise
when regulation of one health risk increases another health risk. 61 Suppose, for
example, that elimination of asbestos, a carcinogenic substance, makes cars less
safe because asbestos is the best substance to use in making brake linings. 62 Or
suppose that the ban on asbestos encourages companies to use even more dangerous substitutes. 63 It is pervasively true that controls on one risk may increase another risk. Unfortunately, risk regulation is not designed with this
problem in mind.
An incipient literature deals with a related issue. It suggests that regulatory
expenditures can profoundly affect social well-being and actually cost health
and even lives. Regulatory expenditures may produce greater unemployment
by increasing production costs and decreasing profits. Unemployment breeds
poverty, which, in turn, breeds poor health and increased mortality rates. A
1990 study developed a model to quantify the common sense view that "richer
is safer."' 4 The study suggests that a regulatory expenditure of $3 million to
$7.5 million may cause a statistical fatality.65
In a concurring opinion in a 1991 D.C. Circuit case involving an occupational safety and health regulation, Judge Williams invoked this evidence to
suggest that OSHA's refusal to engage in cost-benefit analysis might not be
beneficial for workers. 66 Judge Williams reasoned that if a fatality results from
an expenditure of $12 million, some regulations might produce more fatalities
than they prevent. 67 As Table I illustrates, many regulations do cost more than
$12 million per life saved. In Judge Williams' view, an agency that fails to
measure the overall social costs against benefits falls accurately to measure
mortality gains against losses.
60. What constitutes an "increase" depends not merely on quantitative considerations but also on

normative judgments. See text accompanying notes 74-88 infra.
61. See John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, ConfrontingRisk Tradeoffs, in RIsK Vansus
RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECriNG HEALTH AND Tan ENvmoNm'rr 1, 1 (John D. Graham & Jonathan
Baert Wiener eds., 1995), for an excellent overview. See also AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCING FOR
SAFETY48-50 (1988) (discussing the potentially harmful consequences of measures intended to increase
safety); Portney & Stavins, supranote 37, at 115-16 (discussing the tradeoffbetween safety regulations
and the adverse effects of compliance); Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REv.
(forthcoming 1996).

62. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1221 (5th Cir. 1991).
63. See id.
64. Ralph L. Kenney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditure, 10 RiSK ANALsis 147,
148-50 (1990); see also WiLDAVSKY, supranote 61, at 61-68 (explaining the correlation between health

and wealth).
65. See Kenney, supra note 64, at 154, tbl. VI.
66. International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J.,

concurring); see also New York State Ophthalmological Soc'y v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 1379, 1395 n.1 (D.C.
Cir., 1988) (Williams, J., concurring) (explaining that "extravagant expenditures on health may in some
instances affect health adversely, by foreclosing expenditures on items-higher quality food, shelter,
recreation, etc.-that would have contributed more to the individual's health than the direct expenditure
thereon"); Building & Constr. Trades Dep't v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (suggesting
that "leaning towards safety may sometimes have the perverse effect of increasing rather than decreasing risk").

67. International Union, UAW, 938 F.2d at 1326-27.
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The claimed relationship between wealth reductions and mortality is controversial. 68 But a number of studies find such a relationship and indicate that
regulations may, in fact, cause more fatalities than they prevent. Consider the
following 69summary of studies showing a causal relation between wealth and
mortality:
TABLE 2
Summary of Selected Studies on Income and Health
Study

Data

Implicit income gains
necessary to avert
one death (millions)

Comments

Keeney (1990)

Used income and mortality correlations from
Kitagawa and Hauser
(1960) data, and others
Aggregate U.S. income,
employment, mortality,
and morbidity; 19501980
4,878 male workers
over 10 years, 19691979

$12.3

Cited in UA W v. OSHA, as
$7.25 1980 dollars. Represents an upper-bound

$1.8 to $2.7

Reflects income loss from
recession of 1974-1975

$1.9 (wages) $4.3
(other income)

9,618 white married
male workers aged 3564 over 6 years, 19731978
13,954 white married
male workers aged 2564 over 6 years, 19731978
9,618 white married
male workers aged 3564 over 6 years, 19731978
500,000 Canadian workers, over 10-20 years

$2.6

Older workers aged 58-63.
Measured effects of wages
and of value of one's home
on mortality
Controls for prior disability,
and educational attainment

Joint Economic
Committee (1984)
Anderson and
Burkhauser
(1985)
Duleep (1986)

Duleep (1989)

Duleep (1991)

Wolfson (1992)

$6.5

Finds income effects at all
income levels

$3.9

Controls for prior disability,
educational attainment, and
exposure to occupational
hazards
Investigates longevity rather
than mortality. Finds income
effects at highest quintiles of
income
Estimate reflects effect of
income changes on family
mortality. Study does not use
multiple regression, does not
control for prior health status
or education
Uses two measures of health
endowments

$6

National Institutes
of Health (1992)

1,300,000 Americans,
all ages, 1979-1985

$12.4

Chirikos and
Nestel (1991)

5,020 men, aged 50-64
studied during 19711983
5,836 older men over
10 years
38 years of age-adjusted
mortality and income
data for the U.S.

$3.3

Chapman and
Hariharan (1993)
Graham, HungChang, and Evans
(1992)

$12.2
$4.0

Uses four distinct controls for
prior health conditions
Distinguishes effects of permanent income from those of
transitional income

68. See Portney & Stavins, supra note 37, at 118 (arguing that slight real income losses are unlikely to translate into significant, aggregate health impacts).
69. Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall III, Health-HealthAnalysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health
and Safety Regulation, 8 J. RIsK & UNCERTAITY 43, 49, tbl. 1 (1994) (reprinted by permission).
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This work is in its initial stages, and any findings should be taken with
many grains of salt.70 But certainly it would be good for government to know
about unintended adverse consequences and to try to counteract them to the
extent feasible. Unfortunately, there is now no systematic mechanism by
which government regulators are made attentive to harmful unintended
consequences.
4. Government needs more information and should create better
incentives to compile andprovide accurate information.
Often government lacks information about the harms that regulation is
designed to counteract. Often it must act, or fail to act, in a context of considerable scientific uncertainty. 7 1 Without accurate data, any exercise in quantification can be illusory,72 giving the impression of far more knowledge than
people actually have.
In these circumstances government should place a high premium on acquiring as much accurate information as possible. Much of the relevant information can be found in the private sector, which is best equipped to determine
actual emissions levels and the costs of risk control. But the current regulatory
structure does not create incentives to compile accurate information about risks.
Indeed, it creates incentives to distort the facts. Hence industry faces incentives
to report costs that are far higher than reality 73 and is not encouraged to compile more information than is already available.
5.

Government should respond to both expert and citizen judgments in
regulatingrisks.

It seems clear that government should respond to reasonable judgments
about risk; but whose judgments should be counted as reasonable? Countless
studies show systematic differences between expert and citizen judgments
about risk.7 4 This is one of the most robust findings in an extensive litera-

70. See Portney & Stavins, supra note 37, at 118-19 (advocating use of cost-benefit analysis

because the theoretical limitations of health-health analysis make it less useful in practice).
71. See Robert A. Pollak, RegulatingRisks, 33 J. EcoN. LrrERATtu. 179, 183-89 (1995) (examining formaldehyde regulation to emphasize the difficulty of determining what poses a health risk and the
degree to which regulation is necessary).
72. See Sheila Jasanoff, Acceptable Evidence in a PluralisticSociety, in ACCErABLE EvmENcE:
ScIENcE AND VAs.Es IN RiSK MANAGEmENT 29, 42-43 (Deborah G. Mayo & Rachelle D. Hollander
eds., 1991) (attributing the push toward quantification to the adversariness of law and politics in the
United States).
73. See Sunstein, supra note 58, at 656 (explaining that industry has little incentive to provide
information about hazardous products because the information may reduce sales).
74. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 33-40 (discussing risk assessment differences between experts and laypersons).
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ture. 75 The following table summarizes the results of a national opinion poll in
76
which experts and citizens ranked environmental health risks.
TABLE 3
Risk Assessments of the Public and EPA Experts
Public Ranking of Risks

EPA Experts' Ranking

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Medium-to-low
High
Low
Not ranked
Not ranked
Medium-to-low
High
Medium-to-low
Medium

Hazardous waste sites
Exposure to worksite chemicals
Industrial pollution of waterways
Nuclear accident radiation
Radioactive waste
Chemical leaks from underground storage tanks
Pesticides
Pollution from industrial accidents
Water pollution from farm runoff
Tap water contamination
Industrial air pollution
Ozone layer destruction
Coastal water contamination
Sewage-plant water pollution
Vehicle exhaust
Oil spills
Acid rain
Water pollution from urban runoff
Damaged wetlands
Genetic alteration
Non-hazardous waste sites
Greenhouse effect
Indoor air pollution
X-ray radiation
Indoor radon
Microwave oven radiation

High
High
High
Low
Medium-to-low
High
Medium-to-low
High
Medium
Low
Low
Medium-to-low
Low
High
Not ranked
High
Not ranked

A recent study in Canada shows similar results. 77 It reveals that the Canadian public sees cigarette smoking and motor vehicle accidents as far less dangerous than do Canadian toxicologists. It also shows that the public ranks
many risks higher than do toxicologists; the most dramatic disparities along this
dimension involve chemical pollution, ozone depletion, nuclear waste, food additives, pesticides in goods, and PCBs.
What accounts for these differences? Some are simply attributable to citizens' ignorance of scientific facts. This ignorance has many sources, including
78
sensationalist media reports and heuristics that produce systematic biases.
75. See, e.g., id.; BHEy-w, supra note 14, at 33-39 (discussing differences in perceived risks between the public and experts); Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk: Reflections on the Psychometric Paradigm, in SOCIAL THEoRIEs OF RISK 117, 150 (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992)

(explaining that expert risk assessments are based on technical analysis, while public risk assessments
are based on qualitative values).
76. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 36, tbl. 3.
77. Paul Slovic et al., Intuitive Toxicology ff: Expert and Lay Judgments of Chemical Risks in
Canada, 16 RIsK ANALYSis (forthcoming 1996).
78. See Colin Camerer, IndividualDecision Making, in THE HANDBOOK OF ExPEzMENrAL EcoNOMICS 587, 595-96 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).
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For example, people tend to think that an event is more likely when it is "available," that is, when previous occurrences can come readily to mind.79 Perhaps
it is for this reason that people believe that deaths from accidents occur much
more often than deaths from disease, when in fact disease claims fifteen times
as many lives. 80 The availability heuristic suggests also that the public's risk
assessment will be partly an artifact of what the media emphasize. Notably, the
media tend to emphasize unusual and provocative events rather than chronic
risks. 81 The result is substantial distortions in policy, reflected in the "pollutant
82
of the month" syndrome that characterizes many regulatory responses.
When citizens are misinformed, government should not base regulatory decisions on their judgments.8 3 Instead, government should act on the basis of
scientific realities. Public judgments should dictate regulatory policy only
when they are undergirded by sound science, as opposed to sensationalist anecdotes or scare tactics. 84 This is part of the defining creed of a 85deliberative
democracy. Too often, however, the scare tactics have prevailed.
But the misguided fears of citizens provide only part of the story. Some of
the differences between citizens' and experts' assessments of risks involve
value judgments rather than factual misunderstandings. Experts focus principally on aggregate lives at stake. By contrast, citizens consider a range of other
variables: whether risks are equitably distributed, likely to be faced by future
generations, especially dreaded, well-understood, or voluntarily incurred.8 6 Table 4 summarizes psychological research on the effect of value judgments on
risk perceptions.
79. Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implicationsof Cognitive Psychologyfor Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 754 (1990).
80. Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff& Sarah Lichtenstein, Regulationof Risk.A PsychologicalPerspective, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL ScIENcES 241,245 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985). Accidents tend to be more dramatic and thus easier to imagine and recall. Id.
81. See Michael R. Greenberg, David B. Sachsman, Peter M. Sandman & Kandice L. Salomone,
Network Evening News Coverage of Environmental Risk; 9 RISK ANALYSIS 119, 125 (1989) (finding
disproportionate coverage of visual and acute risks).
82. See PETER MENELL & RICHARD STEVART, ENVIRoNMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 420-22 (1994).

83. See Sarah Lichtenstein, Robin Gregory, Paul Slovic & William A. Wagenaar, When Lives Are
in Your Hands: Dilemmas ofthe Societal DecisionMaker, in INsIms INDECISION MAKING: A TRIBUTE
TO HILLEL J. Enlom.N 91, 100-02 (Robin M. Hogarth ed., 1990).
84. It is notable as well that race and gender influence risk perception. For example, white men
tend to view risks as systematically lower and more acceptable than do females and nonwhites. In
addition, while white women see risks as much greater than do white men, nonwhite men and nonwhite
women share similar risk perceptions. James Flynn, Paul Slovic, & C.K. Mertz, Gender, Race; and
Perception of Environmental Health Risks, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 1101, 1102 (1994).
85. See generally AARON WiLDAvsKY, BUT Is ITTRUE?: A CrnzE's GumE TO ENVmONmTAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES (1995) (examining a variety of high-profile health and safety scares and
finding scant scientific justification for the regulatory responses chosen).
86. See Paul Slovic, Beyond Numbers: A BroaderPerspective on Risk Perception and Risk Communication, in ACCEPTABLE EviDENCE: SCIENCE AND VALUES IN RISK MANAGE1MENT, supra note 72, at

48, 56; see also Nancy Kraus, Torbj6m Maimfors & Paul Slovic, Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay
Judgments of ChemicalRisks, 12 RISK ANALYSIS 215, 219 (1992) (discussing the subjective nature of
risk assessments); W. Kip Viscusi, Carcinogen Regulation: Risk Characteristicsand the Synthetic Risk
Bias, 85 AM. ECON. REv., May 1995, at 50, 53-54 (papers & proceedings) (documenting citizens' bias
against synthetic chemicals). See generally Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 55-64 (detailing eight
factors which affect lay perspectives of risks and distinguishing differences in valuation from differences
in factual assumptions).
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TABLE 4
Aggravating and MitigatingFactors in Risk Assessments
Risk Characteristic

Aggravating Factor

Mitigating Factor

nature of risk
permanence
duration
equity
source of risk
freedom
existing understanding
reflection to status quo

dreaded
irreversible/uncontrollable
faced by future generations
unfairly distributed
man-made
voluntarily incurred
known to science
new

acceptable
reversible/controllable
faced only by those now living
fairly distributed
natural
forced exposure
unknown
old

Qualitative distinctions of this kind do not play a role in most expert assessments. But citizen judgments on these points are entirely reasonable. So long
88
as those judgments are both reflective and informed,8 7 they deserve respect.
Any regulatory reform should reflect these qualitative public judgments about
which risks are most severe.
6. Government should concentrate on basic ends rather than means
and should use performance standardsrather than
design standards.
Regulatory policy often deteriorates into an arena for interest-group struggle. This happened most famously with efforts in 1977 to use the Clean Air
Act to promote the interests of eastern coal89 and, in 1990, with interest-group
lobbying on behalf of ethanol producers and other parochial interests. 90 Interest-group maneuvering is an omnipresent issue in federal regulation, especially
when the issue is the "means" of promoting regulatory goals.
Government can limit interest-group power, and at the same time reduce
costs, by focusing legislative attention on ends rather than on means of achiev87. See Paul Slovic, Perceptionof Risk ScL, Apr. 17, 1987, at 280, 285 (concluding that both
public and expert risk assessments should contribute to the regulatory process); Letter from Paul Slovic,
President, Decision Research & Professor of Psychology, U. of Oregon, to Sen. William V. Roth, Jr.
(Mar. 6, 1995) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (criticizing risk assessment for failure to take
account of "many other dimensions of risk that are important psychologically, ethically, and
politically").
88. It is not, however, always simple to distinguish between irrational judgments resulting from
sensationalism and legitimate public value judgments. For example, synthetic risks receive far more
attention than natural risks in public judgments. This pattern tends to explain many apparent anomalies
in federal risk regulation, as synthetic risks are more frequently and more severely regulated. See W.
Kip Viscusi, supra note 86, at 51-52. Viscusi suggests that this perception reflects "bias" and "overreaction." Id. at 54. Perhaps it does. But it is not a simple computational mistake, and it does not reflect, in
any obvious way, a misunderstanding of facts. Perhaps citizens are making judgments about which risks
deserve priority.
89. AcKiYmaN & HASSLER, supra note 14, at 31-33 (tracking the influence exerted by eastern
coal producers in favor of mandating scrubber installation and against clean coal requirements).
90. Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels,Dirty Air, in EviRONamTAL PoLrrcs: PUBLIc CosTs, PmvATE REwaRDs 19, 28-29 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith eds. 1992).
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ing those ends. For this reason, "performance standards" are generally better
than "design standards." 9 1 When a legislature is discussing "means"--ethanol,
electric cars, water pollution control mechanisms-well-organized groups will
see that the choice can provide large competitive benefits (or impose large
competitive burdens). Hence the choice of means invites interest-group struggle with a public-spirited veneer. After all, what matters to the public is
whether the level of emissions is low or high, not whether the relevant company has installed specific scrubbers.
In general, Congress should let administrators decide the appropriate means
for reaching legislatively chosen ends, and administrators should, to the extent
feasible, rely on market forces in selecting those means. For example, if an
industry can comply with a sulfur dioxide emission standard by either using
clean coal or implementing energy conservation methods, government should
not command a particular method of compliance. 92 Industry will understandably choose a method that is cheapest.
These, then, are the principal lessons of the last generation of experience
with regulation: government should set better priorities for risk regulation;
favor flexible, market-based incentives; establish mechanisms to counteract unintended, harmful consequences; create incentives to encourage the private sector to compile risk data; account for public and expert judgments; and use
performance standards rather than design standards. In view of these lessons,
we might conclude that it is well past time to enact an "Administrative Substance Act." The point of such an act would be to capture new learning with
respect to regulatory successes and failures. Though the Administrative Procedure Act has been successful in many ways, it reflects the lawyer's characteristic preoccupation with procedural regularity rather than with substantive
outcomes. An Administrative Substance Act would track the important question: Does regulation actually make things better for citizens?

91. Recent initiatives in the area of occupational safety and health reflect this point. See Remarks
on the National Performance Review, 31 WEEKLY Comp. PRES. Doc. 838, 840 (May 16, 1995) (urging
modification of detailed regulatory standards in favor of greater flexibility); see also Memorandum on
Regulatory Reform, 31 WEEKLY CoMp. PREs. Doc. 363, 363-65 (Mar. 4, 1995) (directing agencies to
discard detailed regulations that undermine regulatory objectives). See generally PnLIP K. HoWARD,
THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW Is SUFFocATING AMERICA (1994) (criticizing regulations
that do not permit common sense judgment).
92. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 made some progress in this direction. See, e.g., Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 401, 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (Supp. V 1993) (setting numerical goals for
emissions reduction but authorizing "alternative methods of compliance"); id. at § 404(f)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7651c(f)(2) (authorizing allowances to electric utilities that avoid emissions through energy conservation and renewable energy methods); id. at § 403(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(b) (allqwing emitters to trade
emission allowances for economic benefit); see also Statement on Signing the Bill Amending the Clean
Air Act, 26 WEEKLY CoMP. Pans. Doc. 1824, 1825 (Nov. 15, 1990) (statement by President Bush
praising the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 for allowing market incentives to generate efficient
environmental protection).

HeinOnline -- 48 Stan. L. Rev. 268 1995-1996

January 1996]
III.

LEGISLATIVE FOREWORD

REGULATORY REFORM AND THE 104TH CONGRESS:
93
AT FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE

A

FAILED EFFORT

Substantive regulatory issues are hardly new to Congress. Recent congres-

sional sessions have devoted significant attention to substantive regulatory reform, usually on a statute-by-statute basis. 94 In 1990, for example, Congress
enacted a set of major changes to the Clean Air Act.95 Changes to the (disastrous 9 6 ) Superfund statute 97 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 98
have received considerable attention in recent years as well.
But the 104th Congress sought something different-far more fundamental
and less piecemeal change, challenging the basic foundations of our legal order,
reappraising the welfare and taxation systems, and reassessing federalism in the
context of the modem state. 99 And after the 1994 elections, it was clear that
regulatory reform would be an important legislative priority. Perhaps this reform would launch a basic assault on the regulatory state and indeed on the
New Deal reformation of American public law.
Note, however, that the 104th Congress faced a far more difficult and complex task than did the New Dealers. This is not only because the nation has not
unambiguously endorsed such fundamental change. It is also because there is a
difference between the elaborate project of reforming existing programs and the
relatively simple creation of new bureaucracies acting under vague statutory
guidance. Under current conditions, the task of fundamental reform calls for
far more numerous and far harder judgments, especially at the legislative level.
Understanding this problem, members of the 104th Congress introduced a

truly remarkable array of proposed legislation.10 0 In the regulatory arena, costbenefit balancing dominated the debate. As we shall see, the notion of costbenefit assessment is quite open-ended; everything depends on the relevant theory of valuation. But there is an unmistakable general trend in the direction of

93. This account is based on the following sources: official government documents, including the
Congressional Record; newspaper accounts; my own participation as a witness before the Senate
Judiciary Committee and the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works; and informal, offthe-record conversations with people involved in the legislative process. I have provided documentation
wherever possible.
94. A key exception is Senate Bill 1080, which passed the Senate by a unanimous vote in 1982,
and which served as an important precedent for the recent initiatives. 128 CoNo. Rac. S5297-305
(1982). The House bill never made it to the floor.
95. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
96. See generally ANALYZiNG SUPERaUtN: EcoNo=cs, SCIENCE, AND LAW (Richard L. Revesz &
Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995).
97. See Superfund Program:Hearings on H.R. 3800 Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Hazardous Materials, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); Superfund Issues FacingMunicipalities:Hearings on
S. 1557 Before the Subcomm. on Superfund, Ocean, and Water Protection,102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
98. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
99. See text accompanying notes 2-6 supra;see also CoNraRcr WITH AMmEICA, supra note 4, at
65-77, 85-90 (proposing reform of the welfare system through "personal responsibility" and transformation of current tax system).

100. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.); Job Creation and Wage Entitlement Act, H.R. 9, 104th

Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act, H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
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evaluating government performance in cost-benefit terms. This development
may ultimately help organize and incorporate recent learning about regulatory
performance.10 1
A.

The Contractand Two Kinds of Supermandates

The Contractwith America expressly addresses government regulation, and
it promises prompt action. In an especially good paragraph, one that deserves
bipartisan endorsement, the Contract states:
Congress is never forced to ensure that the benefits of regulation, better health
and productivity, outweigh the costs, lost jobs, and lower wages. Nor does
Congress pursue integrated health and safety goals. Instead, Congress and federal regulators often attack whatever health risk has caught the public's attention, even if its regulatory solution exacerbates other health risks.102
The Contract promised several concrete steps, including: (a) risk assessment for expensive regulations; (b) a statement of the costs accompanying regulatory initiatives; (c) a comparison of costs and benefits to accompany
regulations; (d) an independent peer review panel to certify the risk assessment;
and (e) an annual report detailing a regulatory budget, to be capped below the
current level. This cap would require agencies to find cost-effective mechanisms and identify policies whose benefits exceed their costs. 10 3 Taken together, these steps may or may not qualify as constitutional in character; but
they certainly would amount to a large-scale revision of current practice.
We might distinguish at this point between two different possible supermandates-requirements that cut across all regulatory statutes and that, in this
sense, operate like constitutional amendments. A substantive supermandate
enacts new decisional criteria that agencies must henceforth follow. A general
requirement of cost-benefit balancing would fall within this category, especially if cost-benefit balancing is defined with a degree of precision. Similarly,
a general ban on regulation of insignificant risks is a substantive supermandate.
A proceduralsupermandate is a provision that requires all agencies to follow
new procedures, going beyond the APA and organic statutes. The Contract
emphasizes procedural supermandates; but its call for cost-benefit comparison
moves in the direction of substance.
The Contractwas of course the focus of sustained legislative attention, especially in the House. In the Congress as a whole, there was much debate
about the unnecessarily high costs of regulation, the need for better regulatory
tools, and the value of balancing rather than absolutism.
Before discussing the details, it is important to say that there were two
overarching strands in the reform efforts. The first strand was technocratic.
Here the reformers' goal was to bring to bear the best in the way of sophisticated policy analysis, so as to ensure better priority-setting and attention to
consequences. Some of the provisions governing risk analysis, cost-benefit
101. See text accompanying note 92.
102. CoNTRAcr Wrr AMERICA, supra note 4, at 131.

103. Id. at 132.
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balancing, and the use of market-based tools reflected the technocratic strand.
Those enthusiastic about some forms of regulation should endorse these provisions.1°4 Indeed, the introduction into Congress of sophisticated learning about
risk regulation was the most impressive feature of the debate.
The second and much less attractive strand is best described as reactionary.
Here the goal was to stall or eliminate regulation whatever its content-largely
with procedural requirements so extensive as to prevent agencies from doing
much at all. The reactionary strand can be found in moratorium provisions,
provisions calling for multiple rounds of judicial review, and above all "look
back" provisions allowing judicial review of agency failure to revise existing
rules. In the 104th Congress, a special irony can be found in the combination
of proposals for extensive and costly procedural and analytic requirements with
proposals for dramatic decreases in appropriations, which would make it far
more difficult for agencies to comply with new legislative requirements. The
reactionary strand is also ill-considered insofar as efforts to slow down or stop
efforts to ease
regulations will prevent agencies from engaging in many current
05
regulatory burdens through new, more flexible initiatives.'
Of course the technocratic and reactionary strands could make some alliances. Good technocrats believe that overregulation is indeed a problem, and
good reactionaries understand that technical tools can limit unjustified regulatory interventions. But the alliance was bound to produce difficulties, since
those interested in technical improvements are unlikely to support measures
that would drown agencies in paperwork requirements or increase their vulnerability to special interests.
For its part, the opposition to the reform efforts also contained two contrasting approaches. To paint with a broad brush: Moderate forces, enthusiastic
about policy analysis, attempted to counter or eliminate the reactionary elements in reform proposals while endorsing the technocratic elements. By contrast, those we might describe as status quo defenders treated existing statutes
as if they actually made a great deal of sense and were working well; their goal
was to protect as much as possible of the existing administrative state. As we
shall see, the Clinton Administration mostly belonged in the former camp, at
least in its public pronouncements.

104. For example, overwhelming evidence demonstrates that cost-benefit analysis justifies a ban
on lead in gasoline. R. KERRY TutmER, DAVID PEa~cE & IAN BATEmA.N, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS:

AN ELENmiNTAY INMODucrioN 100-02 (1993). Note also that President Reagan surprised observers by
supporting aggressive regulation of CFCs, largely because of a cost-benefit analysis from the Council of
Economic Advisers demonstrating that "despite the scientific and economic uncertainties, the monetary
benefits of preventing future deaths from skin cancer far outweighed costs of CFC controls as estimated
either by industry or by EPA.' RICHARD ELUOT BENEDICK, OzoNE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIoNs IN
SAFEGUARDING Tm PLaNr 63 (1991).

105. See note 12 supra.
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B. Particulars
1. Unfunded mandates.
On March 22, 1995, Congress enacted the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act,10 6 which bans Congress from mandating state action without appropriating
federal resources. The Act also contains several provisions directly relevant to
the subject of regulatory reform. Surprisingly, these "sleeper" provisions received almost no public attention and escaped mention during the legislative
debates over the basic regulatory reform bills. This fact says a great deal about
the possibility of legislative coordination of statutory reforms. If a single Congress is unable to coordinate these few reforms over a six-month period, general coordination of statutes enacted in different periods seems unlikely.
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act contains two notable provisions relating to regulatory reform; both grow out of the Contract With America. First,
the Act requires that "a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits of the Federal mandate"' 1 7 accompany significant regulatory action (those that would cost more than $100 million annually). This
assessment must also include: (1) a statement of future compliance costs; (2) a
description of any disproportionate budgetary effects on particular regions or
segments of the private sector; and (3) estimates of the effect of its action "on
the national economy, such as the effect on productivity, economic growth, full
employment, creation of productive jobs, and international competitiveness of
United States goods and services," if accurate estimates are "reasonably feasible" and the effect is "relevant and material."' 0 8
This provision is largely procedural; it counts as a modest kind of procedural supermandate. It probably will not make much of a difference. President
Clinton's Executive Order on Federal Regulation' 0 9 imposes nearly identical
requirements, and while the Order is not subject to judicial review, the "hard
look" doctrine imposes requirements roughly parallel to those of the Act." 0
The second noteworthy provision is more ambitious. It requires that agencies "identify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and
from those alternatives select the least costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule."' 1 The Act exempts agencies from these requirements if compliance would be inconsistent
with the law or if the agency explains its reason for not selecting the least
2
burdensome alternative."
106. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
107. Id. § 202(a)(2), 109 Stat. at 64.
108. Id. § 202(a)(3)-(4), 109 Stat. at 65.
109. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 2 (requiring agencies to assess compliance costs of
regulations).

110. See Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)
(requiring agency to articulate a reasoned basis for regulatory action).
111. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 205(a), 109 Stat. 48, 66
(1995).
112. Id. § 205(b), 109 Stat. at 66.
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Despite this exemption, the provision could have significant consequences.
In many cases it is questionable whether an agency has chosen the most costeffective means of accomplishing regulatory goals. As we have seen, flexible,
market-based incentives may achieve those goals at much less expense than
command-and-control alternatives. 11 3 While the provision may result in considerable litigation about whether existing statutes forbid its approach, it provides an opportunity for extensive rethinking of existing regulatory tools.
Agencies may well be required to use economic incentives where they now use
technological requirements. The provision is not, however, a genuine supermandate because it does not apply if other statutes prohibit agencies from following it.
To the extent that the Act encourages agencies to choose cheaper ways of
achieving regulatory goals, it may be a modest improvement on the current
situation. With these two provisions, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act offers cautious steps in the direction of a general requirement of cost-benefit
balancing.
2. Moratorium and legislative review.
House Bill 450, the Regulatory Transition Act of 1995,114 proposed a moratorium banning all federal regulatory rulemaking, with certain exemptions, during a specified period. The period was scheduled to begin on November 20,
1994, and to end at the earlier of two dates: December 31, 1995, or the day on
which a general regulatory reform bill was enacted.I' s On February 24, 1995,
House Bill 450 was passed by a vote of 276 to 146.116
In the Senate, however, the prospects for House Bill 450 were poor, and for
good reason. Though popular in recent years,' 17 a general moratorium on federal regulation is reactionary in the worst way-a crude, lazy, and pandering
response to current problems. Its blunderbuss quality ensures that it will stop
measures that are otherwise required by law, or that would do a lot of good, as
well as measures that warrant reconsideration (which a moratorium by itself
fails to provide). A special problem is that the moratorium would apply to
measures designed to relieve businesses of expenses and obligations; from the
standpoint of business, a moratorium is only a mixed blessing.11 8 In short, a
moratorium falls to make distinctions that public officials ought to make. Thus
the moratorium idea never received sustained attention in the Senate.
But on March 29, 1995, the Senate passed what it self-consciously considered an alternative: Senate Bill 219, which requires agencies to submit all regulations to Congress and gives Congress an opportunity to "veto" any rule
113. See text accompanying notes 49-58 supra.
114. H.R. 450, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).

115. Id. § 6(2).
116. 141 CONG. REc. H2210 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1995).
117. See, e.g., Memorandum on Implementing Regulatory Reforms, 28 WEEKLY CoMP. PRas.
Doc. 728, 728-29 (Apr. 29, 1992) (discussing the success of a 90 day moratorium on regulations).
118. See note 12 supra (discussing "reinventing govemment" proposals aimed at easing regulatory burdens).
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through the normal process of lawmaking.' ' 9 On April 7, 1995, President Clinton threatened to veto the moratorium proposal,120 but specifically voiced enthusiasm for the Senate bill.12 1 On May 17, 1995, the House passed Senate Bill
219 by voice vote. 122 As of early December, however, no bill had emerged
from the conference committee or been submitted to the President.
3.

Generic reform, supermandates, and APA amendments: the House.

By far the most important, and the most sharply contested, of the regulatory
reform proposals involved so-called generic proposals, representing the most
important changes to the Administrative Procedure Act since its enactment in
1946-a modest constitutional moment unto themselves. The principal theme
in public debate involved the need for cost-benefit balancing; but procedural
supermandates played an enormous role as well.
It is important to say here that regulatory reformers in the House and Senate
argued in favor of a supermandate to be applied to a wide range of statutes.
But the Clinton Administration, along with several others, urged instead a statute-by-statute approach, in which any changes would be based on a careful
inquiry into the particular statute.' 23 On this view, Congress would investigate
the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Delaney Clause, and so forth,
rather than changing the law through generic reform. There were plausible
arguments on both sides. Perhaps particular statutes raise special considerations best addressed by intensely focusing on their particular features. Perhaps
any generic reform would be too crude and too ill-informed.' 24
On the other hand, reformers might urge, with some justification, that generic reform would have some of the virtues of across-the-board tax reform,
base-closing legislation, and the Gramm-Rudman Act. That is, generic reform
might prevent well-organized interest groups from mobilizing in the intense
way they can on specific statutes, thus defeating reform. Generic reform would
119. 141 CONG. Ec. S4758 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1995).
120. Clinton Issues Veto Threats; Urges GOP to Compromise on Agenda, Nat'l Env't Daily

(BNA) (Apr. 11, 1995).
121. House, Senate to Work on Moratorium Differences: Clinton Backs Senate Bill, 64 Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 776 (Apr. 17, 1995) (noting Clinton's support for the Senate Bill). Clinton
released his initial statement on the matter on March 29:
I am deeply committed to regulatory reform that cuts redtape without undercutting the health
and safety of the American people. Giving the Congress 45 days to consider regulations before
they take effect would let lawmakers focus on the specifics of these issues and address real
problems as they come up, without delaying necessary public protections. This approach, not
the blunt instrument of a moratorium, is the right way to reform regulation. It's common
sense.
Statement on Senate Action to Reject a Regulatory Moratorium, 31 WEEKLY CoMP. PEs. Doc. 496,
496 (Mar. 29, 1995).
122. 141 CONG. REc. H5106 (daily ed. May 17, 1995).
123. See, e.g., Regulatory Reform and EnvironmentalLaws: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm.
on EnvironmentandPublic Works, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Carol Browner, Administrator, EPA).
124. See, eg., Hearings on H.R. 994 Before the Subcomm. on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Sally Katzen, Administrator, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, OMB).
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allow legislators to assemble otherwise diffuse and ill-organized public interests in support of general change; it would prevent Congress from becoming
enmeshed in the self-interested struggles that emerge when particular members,
with strong particular interests, are asked to change particular legislation; and it
would embolden legislators to act responsibly because a wide range of interest
groups would be at risk at the same time, and thus be unable to argue that any
one of them had been singled out for special adverse treatment. The reformers
seem to have the better of the argument, at least so long as the supermandate
has sufficient flexibility. Now let us turn to the details.
The generic reform bill in the House, House Bill 1022, was referred to
House committees on February 23, 1995.125 Championed by Representative
David MacIntosh, this bill contained a wide range of requirements. The principal provisions would have imposed:
(1) a requirement of careful risk assessment to accompany new regulations;
(2) a system of peer review for risk assessments, with a specific provision
allowing "peers" with a potential financial stake to participate on peer review
panels;
(3) a codification of President Reagan's Executive Order on federal regulathat regulations be cost-effective and favor
tion, including the requirement
126
least restrictive alternatives;
(4) a general, ambiguous but apparent requirement of cost-benefit balancing,
including perhaps a substantive supermandate2 7to amend all statutes that do
not require or permit cost-benefit balancing;'
(5) a compensation requirement for any government action that reduces the
value of property by more than ten percent; and
(6) a regulatory budget.
This was a remarkably ambitious piece of legislation, with many ambiguities and many provisions that warranted and continue to warrant sustained discussion. For example, a general requirement of cost-benefit balancing would
amend many substantive statutes. Certainly it would be wise to explore the
precise consequences of these amendments. As we will see, the issue became a
central subject of dispute in the Senate.
A compensation requirement for any reduction in property values of ten
percent or more raises even more complex issues. Such a requirement would
be unprecedented, and its consequences are far from clear. The major problem
with such a requirement is that it may deter valuable projects from going for125. 141 CONG. REc. H2176 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1995).
126. Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 2.
127. H.R. 1022 incorporated by reference President Reagan's Executive Order on Federal Regula-

tion, Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 2. The ambiguity stems, in part, from the fact that the require-

ments of that executive order-including the requirement that cost-benefit analysis be the basis for
decision-applied only "to the extent permitted by law." Id. This qualification recognizes that some
statutes prohibit cost-benefit analysis. Since H.R. 1022, if enacted, would be a statute, the effect of the
"to the extent permitted by law" qualification is unclear.
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ward. The government does not extract a benefit whenever its regulations
cause an increase in property values, and in view of the expense of administering a "ten percent or more" compensation requirement, a requirement that the
government compensate the relevant losers might create incentives not to introduce desirable regulations. To know whether the compensation requirement
makes sense, it is necessary to develop a concrete understanding of its effects.
To how many regulations would it apply? What effects would it have on the
treasury? Would it deter government significantly? If so, would the deterrence
be optimal or excessive? Extensive procedural requirements delaying and deterring the "reinventing government"
initiatives as well as everything else, also
1 28
raise many hard issues.
Remarkably, the House held no hearings on these and other questions, passing House Bill 1022 on February 28, 1995-just five days after its reference to
committees-by the overwhelming vote of 286 to 141.129 This was irresponsible; it reflected the power of forces of reaction in the House, which had promised to act in one hundred days. The only possible justification for the speedy
passage would be to spur the Senate to act in a more deliberative fashion. On
April 7, 1995, President Clinton said that he would veto the compensation
requirement. 130

On March 9, the House referred to the Senate House Bill 9,131 a closely
overlapping bill. 132 Perhaps its key provision was section 422, which outlined
the criteria to be satisfied before a final rule is promulgated. The most important of these criteria included requirements (a) "[t]hat the incremental risk reduction or other benefits of any strategy chosen will be likely to justify, and be
reasonably related to, the incremental costs incurred" 133 and (b) "[t]hat other
alternative strategies identified by the agency were found either (A) to be less
cost-effective.., or (B) to provide less flexibility." 134 These decisional criteria
are supposed to "supplement and, to the extent there is a conflict, supersede"
35
the otherwise applicable decision criteria.'
H.R. 9 also contains the "Private Property Protection Act of 1995," requiring compensation for any diminution of the fair market value of property by
20% or more, 136 and the "Regulatory Reform and Relief Act," requiring a complex regulatory impact analysis-including discussions of costs and benefits
and market-based alternatives-and increased hearing requirements in notice
and comment rulemaking. 137 It would include as well the "Risk Management
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See text accompanying notes 199-209 infra.
141 CONG. REc. H2372 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1995).
Clinton Issues Veto Threats; Urges GOP to Compromise on Agenda, supra note 120.
H.R. 9, 104th Cong., IstSess. (1995).
141 CONG. REc. S3743 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1995).
H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 422(a)(2) (1995).

134. Id. § 422(a)(3).
135. Id. § 422(b)(1).
136. Id. § 203(a).
137. Id. §§ 321-331.
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and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995," designed to promote careful risk analysis pursu138
ant to detailed standards.
4. Generic reform: the Senate.
House Bills 1022 and 9 were never introduced in the Senate. Instead, the
Senate debate centered around three proposals for regulatory reform. The resulting debates offered complex interactions between technocratic forces and
those interested in reducing regulation whatever its content. The first bill, Senate Bill 291, introduced by Senator Roth on January 27, 1995, called for comparatively modest changes in the Administrative Procedure Act. It included
two principal sets of provisions. 139 The first would require detailed risk assessment, in ways comparable to House Bill 1022. The second would require agencies to favor flexible, market-based incentives rather than rigid commands in
formulating regulations. The bill received broad bipartisan support and was
unanimously reported out of the Governmental Affairs Committee on March
23, 1995.140

The second bill, Senate Bill 343, championed by Senator Dole, was more
ambitious. It received far more attention and became the focal point for legislative debate. The Dole bill--obviously connected with issues of presidential
politics-was introduced on February 2, 1995.141 Unlike the Roth proposal,
this bill contained no specific provision requiring agencies to use economic
incentives. It did, however, contain several controversial provisions. Three in
particular deserve mention here. First, the bill would have banned agencies
from acting unless a federal statute explicitly required them to do so.142 Second, the bill included a complex supermandate requiring agencies to apply costbenefit analysis to all regulations unless "explicit textual language" of the authorizing statute required otherwise. 143
Finally, the Dole bill would impose several layers of procedural scrutiny,
including peer, congressional, and judicial review. Echoing House Bill 1022,
the Dole bill's peer review provision did not disqualify "peers" with potential
financial interests. 144 In addition, the Dole bill allowed any person affected by
a regulation to petition agencies for review of existing rules, under the new
cost-benefit criteria, and seek judicial review of the denial of any such petition.
The Dole bill also called for judicial review of any risk-assessment or costbenefit analysis. Finally, the bill provided for congressional review of major
138. Id. § 402.
139. S. 291, 104th Cong., IstSess. (1995).
140. 141 CONG. REc. D402-03 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995); Senate Panel Okays 'Bipartisan'Regulatory Reform Bill Unanimously,PEmSTcmE & Toxic CHEM. NEWS, Mar. 29, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News library, Nwltrs file.
141. 141 CONG. REc. S2034 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995).
142. S.343, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 628 (1995). This was a truly remarkable provision. Most
agency action is not, strictly speaking, required by statute; hence the Dole bill would ban a wide range of
routine administrative acts.
143. Id. § 623(b). The desirability of this supermandate was a key question in Senate debates.
E.g., 141 CONG. Rc. S10,107-08 (daily ed. July 17, 1995) (statement of Sen. Johnson).

144. S.343 § 622(c)(1)(B)(ii).

HeinOnline -- 48 Stan. L. Rev. 277 1995-1996

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:247

regulations through a formal submission process that gave Congress an opportunity to veto. As we have seen, this provision was enacted separately in Senate Bill 219.145
By late June, the Dole bill had undergone four major revisions. The first
was the "Grassley" substitute, which eliminated some of the most extreme proposals, including the provision saying that agencies should not act unless required to do so and the judicial review provisions, which were clarified and
softened. The informally named Grassley substitute-so-called after Senator
Grassley became a co-sponsor on March 22, 1995-responded to many of the
sharpest criticisms of the original Dole bill.
At this stage President Clinton's signals were somewhat mixed. In an important speech on April 7, the President indicated that he would veto any legislation that would undermine protection of clean air and clean water; but he did
not offer details. He also said that he would veto any generic bill that would
lead to litigation preventing regulators from doing their work. But President
Clinton did not specifically address Senate Bill 343, nor did he explain whether
he believed the bill had these adverse effects. It was not clear whether the
President would veto the Dole bill. 14 6
On May 26, the second revision of the Dole bill was introduced. The revision eliminated interlocutory judicial review of agency determinations that a
regulation was major and therefore subject to a risk assessment.' 47 The revision also added a provision that would preclude agencies from regulating "insignificant" risks, and would thereby repeal the well-known and highly
controversial Delaney Clause, which forbids the use of carcinogens in food
additives. 148 Proponents of this provision rejected the zero risk standard established by the Delaney Clause as inflexible and outdated.
The third revision to the Dole bill sprang from a joint effort between Senators Dole and Johnston. The "staff drafts" that resulted from their intense discussions continued in the direction set by the Grassley substitute. First, they
reduced judicial control by limiting judicial review of agency rulemaking.' 4 9
Second, they broadened the definition of benefits to include environmental as
well as social and economic effects. 150
Apparently at the behest of lobbyists, a new provision was added to alter
the requirements for the Toxic Substances Inventory under the Superfund statute. Under current law, all toxic chemical releases must be disclosed to the
public.' 5 l Under the proposed provision, disclosure would be required only if
145. See text accompanying notes 120-122 supra.
146. Clinton Issues Veto Threats; Urges GOP to Compromise on Agenda, supra note 120.

147. S. REP. No. 90, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 146-47 (1995) (amending S. 343 to amend the Administrative Procedure Act by adding § 625).
148. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1988). The repeal of the Delaney Clause was central to the Senate
debate. See, e.g., 142 CoNG. REc. S9412 (daily ed. June 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kerry opposing S.
343 partly because it would eradicate the Delaney Clause).
149. 141 CONG. REc. S8796 (daily ed. June 21, 1995).
150. Id.
151. Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986 § 313(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 11,023(a) (1988).
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EPA found a reasonable basis to believe that the toxic release created a risk to
human health. 15 2 This provision became crucial to Senate debates.
After complex negotiations, a fourth version of Senate Bill 343, now called
the Dole-Johnston bill, emerged. 15 3 The bill appeared to eliminate the socalled supermandate provision of the original bill since it did not expressly
amend existing statutes to mandate cost-benefit analysis. Instead, in a more
ambiguous formulation, the bill proposed certain decisional criteria that would
"supplement" and not "supersede" existing legislation. These criteria included
requirements that benefits justify costs and that agencies choose least-cost alternatives. The Dole-Johnston bill retained the original provisions requiring agencies to review existing rules and to test them for conformity to the new criteria.
To enforce this requirement, it maintained provisions permitting industries to
petition an agency for review of existing rules under the new criteria and included provisions for judicial oversight of an agency's failure to respond to or
to grant a petition for review.15 4 In addition, rules that were not promptly re1 55
viewed would expire automatically.
The Dole-Johnston bill also maintained the basic requirements of risk assessment and the judicial review provisions. Importantly, the bill restored interlocutory jurisdiction to the federal courts to review an agency's
determination that a rule is not "major" or that a risk assessment is not required. 156 The bill also restated the law governing review of agency action,
1 57
though it probably would not change the law in any material way.
The debate intensified with Senator Glenn's introduction of the Democratic
alternative, Senate Bill 1001, on June 29.158 President Clinton endorsed the
Glenn bill in mid-July.1 59 Senator Glenn self-consciously built on Senator
Roth's bill, which had received enthusiastic bipartisan support in the Governmental Affairs Committee.1 60 In fact the Glenn bill differed from the Roth bill
in only a few particulars. Like Roth's bill, the Glenn bill clearly would not
override the substantive requirements of existing laws. Responding to some of
the sharpest criticisms of the Dole bill, the Glenn bill limited judicial review. It
allowed agencies to review existing rules, but did not call for automatic termination of those rules that were not reviewed; and it eliminated any petition
152. 141 CoNG. REc. S9549-50 (daily ed. June 30, 1995). The new language authorizes the EPA
to use not only scientific, epidemiological, and population data in determining whether to add a particu-

lar chemical to the list of chemicals the release of which must be disclosed, but also "the role of reason,
including a consideration of the applicability of such evidence to levels of the chemical in the environment that may result from reasonably anticipated releases.' Id.
153. 141 CoNG. REc. S9542-52 (daily ed. June 30, 1995).
154. 141 CoNG. REc. S9545 (daily ed. June 30, 1995).
155. Id.
156. 141 CoNG. Rac. S9546 (daily ed. June 30, 1995).
157. The provisions were very close to modem hard look review. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulotion and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. RaE. 177, 181-84 (examining courts' use of the
Administrative Procedure Act to require that agencies, and reviewing courts, take a "hard look" at
regulations).
158. S. 1001, 104th Cong., IstSess. (1995).
159. Nancy Benac, Clinton and GOP Squabble Over BureaucraticReform, AusTIN AM EwcANSTAmSmAN, July 16, 1995, at A8.
160. See 141 CONG. REc. S9447 (daily ed. June 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Glenn).
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process for those dissatisfied with existing rules. The Glenn bill did not require
agencies to show that a risk is "significant"; in this way it would not have
16 1
repealed the Delaney Clause.
On behalf of his proposal, Senator Glenn emphasized five central points.
First, his proposal contained more limited judicial review of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment than the Dole bill. Second, his proposal would be procedural rather than substantive; thus it would not affect the Delaney Clause or
the Toxic Release Inventory. Third, it would not include a petition process.
Fourth, it would not include a supermandate and hence would not affect existing statutory requirements. Fifth, its "sunshine" provision would ensure public disclosure of communications between agencies and the Office of
Management and Budget and of information relating to the status of regulatory
62
review.1
From June 30 through July 20, the Senate vigorously debated the DoleJohnston and Glenn proposals. The debate centered on several issues, including the scope of judicial review, the petition process, the supermandate issue,
amendments to the Delaney Clause, 163 and the Toxic Release Inventory. 164
Consider the following much-disputed language from a late draft of the Dole
bill:
(a) ... The requirements of this section [624] shall supplement, and not
supersede, any other decisional criteria otherwise provided by law.
(b) ... [N]o final major rule... shall be promulgated unless the agency
head publishes in the Federal Register a finding that(1) the benefits from the rule justify the costs of the rule;
(2) the rule employs to the extent practicable flexible reasonable alternatives [that is, economic incentives] ... ; and
(3) (A) the rule adopts the least cost alternative...
(B) if scientific, technical, or economic uncertainties or nonquantifiable
benefits ... make a more costly alternative ... appropriate and in the public
interest and the agency head provides an explanation of those considerations,
the rule adopts the least cost alternative of the reasonable alternatives necessary
to take into account such uncertainties or benefits; and
(4) if a risk assessment is required ....
(A) the rule is likely to significantly reduce the human health, safety, and
environmental risks to be addressed; or
161. 141 CONG. Rac. S9490-91 (daily ed. June 30, 1995).
162. 141 CoNG. REc. S9447-48 (daily ed. June 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Glenn). The disclosure requirement has an extensive background and had already been imposed by Executive Order
12,866. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 20-24 (discussing background and noting that the
extent of disclosure required under the Administrative Procedure Act is not clear).

163. Interestingly, the executive branch has tried unsuccessfully to read a "de minimis exception"
into the Delaney Clause. See Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting criticism of
Delaney Clause, but rejecting de minimis exception); Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1110-13
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (ruling that de minimis standard violates the "legislative design" of the Delaney
Clause).
164. E.g., 141 CONG. REc. S9989-96 (daily ed. July 14, 1995) (debate among Senators Chafee,
Levin, Hatch, and Glenn over merits of the Dole bill and the Glenn bill).
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(B) if scientific, technical, or economic uncertainties or nonquantifiable

benefits.., preclude making the finding under subparagraph (A), promulgating the final rule is nevertheless justified for reasons stated in writing accompanying the rule ....165
The debate prompted Senate Republicans to make a number of significant
changes to the Dole bill. On July 10, the Senate passed the Nunn-Coverdell
Amendment, which requires agencies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of any
rules having a significant economic effect on small business. 166 On July 11,
the Senate adopted an amendment by Senator Dole, to clarify that the bill contained no supermandate.1 67 This was crucial to several of the holdout voters,

though some apparently thought the clarification was not clear enough. The
Senate also revised the threshold definition of a major rule from $50 million to
$100 million. On July 13, the Senate adopted, by voice vote, a Roth-Biden
Amendment designed to ensure better priority-setting and attention to market
incentives. 168 The Senate also adopted an amendment preventing those with a
conflict of interest from participating on peer review panels. 169 On the same
day, the Senate tabled, by a vote of 50 to 48, an amendment to strike the provi170
sions relating to the Toxic Release Inventory.
In this period, issues about food safety became central to the debate. Several cases of E. coli poisoning-heavily publicized in the key primary state of
New Hampshire-threatened to turn the issue of regulatory reform into an obstacle to Senator Dole's presidential hopes. Advertisements in New Hampshire
included accusations by a group of parents of children sickened or killed by
contaminated meat that Dole was "trying to please his big contributors instead
of protecting kids."'1 7 1 Nonetheless, Senate Republicans, supported by medical
experts, refused to amend the Dole bill's repeal of the Delaney Clause. 172
On July 18, the Senate narrowly rejected the Glenn bill by a margin of 52 to
48.173 The same day, the Senate rejected cloture on the Dole bill by a vote of
53 to 47.174 And two days later, the Dole-Johnston forces again failed to close
further debate, this time by only two votes. 175 This last vote effectively killed
165.
166.
167.
168.

141
141
141
141

CONG.
CONG.
CoNG.
CoNG.

REc.
Rac.
REc.
REc.

S9545-46 (daily ed. June 30, 1995).
D821 (daily ed. July 10, 1995).
D830 (daily ed. July 11, 1995).
D849 (daily ed. July 13, 1995).

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. William M. Welch, Food-Safety FearSlows DeregulationDrives, USA TODAY, July 21-23,
1995, at 8A (quoting New Hampshire television ad). See generally Statement by Gore on Regulatory
Reform and E. Coil Illnesses, U.S. Nawswna, July 17, 1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Wires
File (describing five severe cases of E. coli poisoning in Tennessee and connecting the cases to the
regulatory reform bill).
172. Senate Republicans enlisted the support of former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop to denounce the Delaney Clause. News Conference with Senator Bob Dole, C. Everett Koop, and Others
Regarding Regulatory Reform, FED. NEws SERV., July 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Fednew File.
173. 141 Cong. Rec. D869 (daily ed. July 18, 1995).

174. Id.
175. 141 CONG. Rac. D888 (daily ed. July 20, 1995).
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the bill, and the prospects for regulatory reform dimmed-despite the fact that
a strong majority of the members favored the idea.
There were a few dying embers. Senate Democrats, led by Senators Conrad
and Robb, attempted to assemble a coalition to enact some combination of the
Glenn and Dole bills. Although it looked at first as if compromise might be
possible, Senate Republicans rejected the compromise proposal. 17 6 The major
sticking points were the amendment of the Delaney Clause, changes in the
Toxic Release Inventory, and the review of existing regulations. 177 The Democrats attempted to eliminate these provisions. Dole and his allies, backed by
public statements from business groups, 178 firmly rejected the attempt at compromise. At this point, efforts at generic reform failed. Oddly, the failure was
a result of an alliance among status quo defenders-attacking the quite sensible
repeal of the Delaney Clause-and technocratic forces objecting to the Dole
bill's excessive procedural provisions.
5. Statute-by-statute reform and appropriations.
In addition to the generic reform proposals, Congress discussed at least
twenty-five statute-specific proposals in an effort to produce substantive regulatory reform. 179 I cannot discuss them in detail here. But it is worth noting that
among the most prominent of these were dramatic proposals to reform the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act. Although the Clean Water Act
amendments passed in the House by a vote of 240 to 185 on May 16,180 the
eliminated when President
prospects for substantial change were essentially
181
Clinton announced that he would veto the bill.
Of particular importance was an appropriations bill containing provisions
designed to limit the power of the EPA.18 2 The bill proposed, among other
176. Hopefor Regulatory Reform Passagein Senate Dims As Compromise Fails,WASH. BavawAGE INsGHT (George Wells & Assocs., Inc.) Aug. 11, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nwltrs
File.
177. Regulatory Reform: Conradto BringProposalto Dolefor Modifying Senate RegulatoryBill,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 146, at D-13 (July 31, 1995).
178. Mike Hudson, Robb Trying To Keep 'RegulatoryReform' Out ofSpotlight, RoAoKE TMES
& WoR.LD NEws, Aug. 14, 1995, at Al (quoting an Alliance for Reasonable Reform statement that the
Robb proposal "kills prospects for real regulatory reform"); US Industry Group Slams Regulation Bill
Compromise, Reuters, Aug. 7, 1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (quoting statement
by Jerry Jasinowski, President of the National Association of Manufacturers, to the effect that "[wle
would be better offwith no bill than adopting this proposal that takes the heart out of S. 343 and kills the
prospects for real regulatory reform"). Interestingly, despite Republican assurances that no supermandate was intended, see text accompanying note 167 supra, business group opposition was based in
part on the claim that the Democratic proposal would soften the supermandate. Patrice Hill, Regulatory
Reform Unlikely to Pass, WASH. Tms, Aug. 9, 1995, at A7.
179. See, e.g., S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (deregulating telecommunication industry);
H.R. 1184, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (reducing regulatory burdens on creditors); H.R. 839, 104th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1995) (placing moratorium on small business regulation).
180. 141 CoNG. REc. D612 (daily ed. May 16, 1995).
181. Peter H. Lehner, The Debate Over Clean Water; Amendments Point to Costs of Pollution,
N.Y. L.J., June 12, 1995, at S1.
182. H.R. 2099, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing a 50% reduction in EPA's enforcement
funding); see also Brian Broderick & Katherine Stimmel, Clinton Threatens to Veto EPA Money Bill,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 146, at D-33 (July 31, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library,
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things, to halt enforcement of the Great Lakes water quality standards; prohibit
enforcement of "raw sewage" rules governing beaches; prevent enforcement of
a ban on illegal filling of wetlands; eliminate EPA's ability to set standards to
prevent industrial water pollution; block use of funds to limit urban air pollution through commuter trip reduction; curtail regulation of toxic air pollutants
from oil refineries; prohibit EPA from gathering health risk information about
oil and gas releases; forbid EPA from finalizing any proposals for drinking
water protections against radon and arsenic; protect chemical manufacturers
from having to report uses of chemicals; restrict EPA from setting standards for
pesticides in food; and ban the addition of new species to the list of endangered
18 3
species under the Endangered Species Act.
The prospects for these provisions were dim in the Senate. Moreover, it
was clear that President Clinton would veto the appropriations bill whether or
not it included these provisions. 184 The proposed appropriations cuts were notable (and disturbing) insofar as they suggested a desire both to reduce environmental regulation through a relatively less visible mechanism and to prevent
agencies from developing the analytical capacity that would enable them to
engage in good policy analysis.
The House was also able to inaugurate a new tradition: Speaker Newt
Gingrich proposed a bill creating "Corrections Day" to be held on the second
and fourth Tuesday of each month, on which the House would debate bills to
repeal or modify agency regulations or statutes enacted by Congress. 185 The
House adopted the rules for Corrections Day on June 20, 1995, by a vote of 271
to 146.186 A three-fifths majority would be required for a "correction."
Of course appropriations issues in general became, in October 1995, a central feature of the attempted revision of American government. I cannot discuss the resulting debate in detail here. But it is important to identify the most
striking fact of the debate: Many diverse substantive issues-involving welfare reform, Medicaid, environmental issues, and much more-were dealt with
all at once under the single heading of appropriations.
This development made crystal clear and highly visible a growing fact of
American government, namely that substantive policy is made, not simply by
deciding on funding levels, but also through conditions and limitations attached
to funds. These conditions and limitations can move government in very new
directions. Thus the principal debates between President Clinton and the 104th
Congress often took the form of debates over appropriations bills. 187 And the
BNA File. Also included was a controversial proposal to open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to
oil drilling. See id.
183. H.R. 2099, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
184. See Broderick & Stimmel, supra note 182. In fact, even the House has apparently withdrawn
support of such limitations on the EPA. John H. Cushman Jr., House Rejects Plan to Limit E.P.A. 's
Power, N.Y. Tmms, Nov. 3, 1995, at Al, A8 (asserting that House defeat of limitation provisions "was
the clearest signal to date of a growing reluctance in Congress to radically alter existing environmental

laws').
185. H.R. 168, 104th Cong., IstSess. (1995).
186. 141 CoNo. Rac. H6116 (daily ed. June 20, 1995).

187. See Cushman, supra note 184, at Al, AS.
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substantive changes proposed in the October 1995 bills were much more farreaching than the substantive changes proposed in (for example) the generic
regulatory reform legislation. Indeed, the appropriations bills would have a
wide range of effects on regulation itself, not excluding the environmental area,
where restrictions would sharply reduce EPA authority.' 88
6. A note on the politics of regulatory reform.
In the end regulatory reform failed because the public was not unambiguously committed to it. But many political factors shaped Congress' efforts as
well. Industry pressure, public sentiment, presidential veto threats, and institutional realities all steered reform efforts. I offer some brief notes here.
Interest groups played a significant role with respect to the generic statutes.
For example, the Grocery Manufacturers Association helped write the Dole
bill's provision that would have repealed the Delaney Clause.18 9 Industry representatives also contributed substantially to specific statutes. For example,
corporate lobbyists drafted proposed revisions to the Clean Water Act and the
Endangered Species Act. 19 0
More generally, the Senate acted-as it historically has-as a "cooler" for
House bills, operating in a slower and more deliberative manner. 19' Recall that
the House passed its generic reform bill just five days after it was introduced. 192 This pattern was widely noticed in the 104th Congress. The House
acted rapidly and sloppily; the Senate held hearings and took its time.
7. An evaluation: contract without (enough) deliberation.
What are we to make of this complex set of events? The performance of
the House of Representatives deserves much criticism and little praise. The
House generic reform initiative, House Bill 1022, was not a good bill. It contained a number of promising ideas, and in some ways it might well have improved current regulatory practices. But it was also very much a mess: sloppy,
confusing, and filled with provisions that had not been thought through. It was
far too rushed and ill-considered. It was a parody of deliberative democracy.
The best that might be said for the House's actions is that prompt passage
of House Bill 1022 spurred a debate in the Senate and indeed the nation that
was certainly overdue and might not have otherwise occurred. From this perspective, House Bill 1022 served less as a proposed law than as an actionforcing mechanism designed to prompt a more deliberative effort in the Senate.
188. Id.
189. Marian Burros, Congress Moving to Revamp on FoodSafety, N.Y. TiMES, July 3, 1995, § I
at 1,2.
190. John Cushman Jr., Lobbyists Helped Revise Laws on Water, N.Y. Tusas, Mar. 22, 1995, at
A16; Timothy Egan, Industries Affected by EndangeredSpecies Act Help a Senator Rewrite Its Provisions, N.Y. TimES, Apr. 13, 1995, at A20; George Miller, Authors of the Law, N.Y. TimEs, May 24,

1995, at A21.
191. See, e.g., Charles E. Cook, For GOP Contract,the Senate Provesto be a Sticky Place,ROLL
CALL, Aug. 3, 1995; Helen Dewar, As Senate Fleesfor Recess, 'Contract'ItemsLanguish, WASH. PoST,

Aug 12, 1995, at Al.
192. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
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Much proposed legislation in the 104th Congress had a similar effect. It justifies George Washington's supposed observations about bicameralism. Thomas
Jefferson is said to have asked Washington, over breakfast, why the Constitution provides for the Senate as well as the House. Washington responded:
"Why did you pour that coffee into your saucer?" Jefferson responded: "To
cool it." Washington's rejoinder was: "Even so, we pour legislation into the
senatorial saucer to cool it.'

19 3

Perhaps the goal of the House was to set pro-

posals before the Senate in the hope that seeing the general direction in which
the nation should move, the Senate would enact more responsible and careful
proposals.
What about the Senate? A charitable observer can find much ground for
enthusiasm. All of the relevant proposals incorporated an understanding that
balancing is better than absolutism. Despite its symbolic value, the Delaney
Clause is hard to defend; indeed, it is far from clear that the Clause promotes
human health. 194 An exemption of de minimis risks would advance the process
of good priority-setting. Here technocratic learning should have produced a
bipartisan consensus. Also promising was the Senate's enthusiasm for market
incentives and for least-cost solutions. Moreover, the Senate proceeded in a
more or less deliberative manner. Unlike the House, it held extensive hearings
and its members engaged in lengthy and sometimes productive debates. The
Roth-Biden Amendment, an effort to promote better priority-setting, showed an
admirable understanding of qualitative differences among diverse risks. 195 Perhaps the 104th Congress served as a transitional one in which a great deal of
learning occurred.
But an account of this sort would probably be too enthusiastic. Much of the
debate dwelled on unhelpful dichotomies: whether we should have "more"
rather than "less" regulation and whether the Dole bill "went too far" or the
Glenn bill "did too little."' 9 6 Too often Congress avoided substantive issues by
focusing on procedure; too often Senators proposed procedural solutions instead of making hard choices. Many initiatives attempted to derail the administrative state through paperwork requirements.
In the next section, I spell out these criticisms and suggest some possible
improvements. But for the moment a more general conclusion is appropriate.
The task of fundamentally reforming the modem regulatory state is complex
and unwieldy; the 104th Congress faced (and the 105th and 106th Congresses
will face) a job far more complex than anything faced by New Deal Congresses-and this notwithstanding the fact that the nation is in far better shape
193. See, eg., Theo Lippman Jr., Editorial, B ATmoRa SuN, May 11, 1995, at 22A.
194. See Richard A. Merrill, Reducing Diet-InducedCancer Through FederalRegulation: Opportunities and Obstacles, 38 VAND. L. Rav. 513, 514-15 (1985) (noting EPA's blind regulation of one risk
without attending to the risk posed by alteration).
195. 141 Coxo. REc. S9836 (daily ed. July 13, 1995); see also notes 86-87supraand accompany-

ing text.
196. E.g., 141 CoNG. REc. 510,090 (daily ed. July 17, 1995) (statement of Sen. Glenn) ("I am
convinced that the Dole-Johnston substitute goes too far."); 141 CoNG. Rc. S9699 (daily ed. July 11,
1995) (statement of Sen. Hutchison) ("So I think it is a matter of do we err on the side of doing too
much or do we err on the side of doing too little?").
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than it was during the Depression. We might even conclude, at least provisionally, that Congress is institutionally ill-equipped to attempt major reform, at
least if it does a great deal at the micro level. Legislators are generalists, not
specialists, and they have many issues to address. They lack expertise in particular areas. They are also subject to intense political pressures that can favor
"lowest common denominator" solutions. Disagreements within the House and
Senate can lead in similar directions.
In the 104th Congress, the House was able to act quickly, driven by the
discipline demanded by the Contract with America and Speaker of the House
Newt Gingrich; yet the results are nothing to celebrate. The Senate was not
similarly unified, and hence the process of deliberation produced nothing at all.
The executive branch has major advantages on this count. It can more easily
use specialized experience.1 97 I will return to these issues below;1 98 but for the
moment let us consider how Congress might have done better.
IV. ToWARD NEw INiTATIVES
A. Procedure and Paperwork: Less Is More
Part of the 104th Congress' attempt at regulatory reform involved not substantive criteria but paperwork requirements designed to delay and thwart the
issuance of regulations.1 99 This strategy resembles the "moratorium" ideanot an effort to design good regulations and to prevent bad ones, but instead an
indiscriminate strategy to stultify agencies, even though agencies might be trying to reduce regulatory burdens.
A particular problem in the relevant bills is the addition of multiple new
layers of review-by courts, peers, and Congress itself. In this context, Congress should have followed a strategy of addition by subtraction. Future Congresses might build on the current proposals by making them leaner-more in
the way of substance, less in the way of paperwork.
1. Existing rules andjudicialreview.
Much of the debate in the Senate stemmed from the Dole bill's complex
provisions compelling agencies to undertake reviews of existing rules. These
provisions are an understandable effort to ensure that agencies do not maintain
rules that cost much and accomplish little or no good. 20 0 Moreover, regulations
can become obsolete, and a mechanism for ensuring periodic review makes a
good deal of sense.
On balance, however, the proposed petition process is not easy to defend.
Such a process could increase interest-group power, prevent agencies from devoting their limited resources to the most important matters, increase uncer197. See note 12 supra (discussing the "reinventing govemmenf' material).
198. See text accompanying notes 228-229 infra.
199. These efforts would thus aggravate the problem of "ossification" of rulemaking. See generally Thomas 0. MeGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DKnE LJ.
1385 (identifying and analyzing the "ossification" of informal rulemaking).
200. Cf HowARD, supra note 91 (discussing rigidity and senselessness of many rules).
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tainty about existing rules, produce random agenda selection, and allow people
in the private sector to divert taxpayer resources for what may well be insufficient gain. Review of existing rules requires substantial resources, and if agencies are required to revisit current rules each time an affected party raises a
question, the petition process could create the very kind of rigidity that good
regulatory reform strives to prevent.
In some areas, the petition process is quite unnecessary. Under Presidents
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, many agencies have already done some kind of
cost-benefit analysis. 20 1 For this reason, it is unclear that the petition process
would do much good. To be sure, past cost-benefit analyses were done under
somewhat different standards from those that would have been created by Senate Bill 343; and independent agencies were exempted from previous presidential requirements (a gap filled by Senate Bill 343). In this way, Senate Bill 343
would not be entirely unnecessary. The process could, however, cause real
harm by making the status of existing rules unclear and by drowning agencies
in paperwork. Critically, any right to petition would allow private parties to set
the public agenda and to coopt public resources for the sake of undertaking a
costly, complex, and possibly redundant analysis of existing rules. If people in
the private sector could ask all agencies to undertake cost-benefit analyses
under the new standards of Senate Bill 343, they would be able to use taxpayer
resources for analyses that simply produce waste and delay.2 0 2 In light of the
fact that Senate Bill 343 would apply to many hundreds and perhaps thousands
of rules, the paperwork burden could be enormous.
The prospect of judicial review raises further difficulties. If courts can review denial of petitions to review existing rules, there will be high litigation
costs. This is especially true since the petition process would require an agency
to decide whether "reasonable questions exist '2 0 3 about the cost-benefit judgment and would allow judicial review of agency decisions on this point. In
many cases, "reasonable questions" do "exist," and hence judicial involvement
and management might well be common.
Notably, Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton all decided to insulate costbenefit analyses from the judiciary---on the theory that judicial review would
produce delay, confusion, and error, especially in light of the judges' lack of
democratic accountability or factfinding competence. The executive branch
and Congress both seem better equipped to use cost-benefit analysis to evaluate
and correct most regulations. It probably does make sense to subject cost-benefit analysis to judicial review when the agency's decision does, under the relevant statute, depend on that analysis. It may also make sense to include any
cost-benefit or risk assessment in the whole record for review of rules. But
beyond this, judicial review should not take place.
201. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 2; Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 2.
202. To be sure, many agencies might respond to petitions simply by repeating a cost-benefit
analysis calculated pursuant to executive orders. But the different standards of Senate Bill 343 will
require agencies to recalculate some cost-benefit analyses, and new data will require the updating of
others.
203. S. 343, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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"Peer review."

Both House Bill 1022 and Senate Bill 343 show enthusiasm for "peer review." In particular, section 640 of Senate Bill 343 would require the executive branch to develop a "systematic program for the peer review" of risk
assessments. This provision moves in a sensible direction-toward a greater
role for the executive branch in generating uniform risk assessment guidelines
and in ranking risks and establishing priorities for Congress, agencies, and the
public.2° 4 No institution in government is currently charged with this important task. Peer review might well play a role in this process.
In its current form, however, a requirement of peer review for risk assessment is premature. Any "systematic program for peer review" could prove
enormously expensive and produce unnecessary delay. Of course, no "peers"
are entirely objective; judgments about risk necessarily depend on assumptions,
and those assumptions will likely be founded on judgments of value. 205 Since
"peers" may well have their own agendas, the process of peer review could
aggravate the problems raised by interest-group power over regulation.
It is also unclear whether, in light of the rest of Senate Bill 343, the peer
review process is at all necessary, or whether its goals could not be promoted in
other ways. Agencies now experiment with peer review when it seems to make
sense, and the conventional process of notice and comment allows a high degree of peer "review" of agency proposals. In any case, both the House and
Senate bills create at least the appearance of impropriety insofar as they allow
20 6
participation by peer reviewers with a potential conflict of interest.
Section 640 of Senate Bill 343 should be eliminated. Certainly people with
a potential financial interest should not be allowed to participate on peer review
panels. Agencies should be encouraged to experiment with such panels, but
any generic requirement should await the outcomes of these experiments.
3.

Joint resolution of disapproval.

Both Houses of Congress passed legislation requiring certain regulations to
be submitted to Congress for potential veto. Thus under section 801 of Senate
Bill 343, major regulations would be submitted to Congress before taking effect, and Congress could enact a "joint resolution of disapproval" to stop such
regulations from becoming law. Since these joint resolutions result from bicameral action and are submitted to the President for his signature, there is no
constitutional problem with this provision.
The provision for congressional review has obvious virtues. It appears to
enhance political accountability by providing a formal mechanism by which
elected representatives may oversee, and eliminate, proposed regulations. The
204. HARVARD GRoUP ON RISK MANAGEMENT REFORM, supra note 38, at 22-30 (calling for Congress to centralize "leadership of the assessment and ranking of risks in the Office of Science and

Technology Policy of the Executive Office of the President"); see text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
205. See Slovic, supra note 86, at 56; text accompanying note 86 supra.
206. House Bill 1022 provides that the peer review program "shall not exclude peer reviewers...
merely because they represent entities that may have a potential interest in the outcome." H.R. 1022,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(a)(3) (1995).
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process of congressional review might also deter agencies from submitting illconsidered or faction-driven regulations to Congress. Moreover, agencies
might more frequently signal to Congress that some statutorily mandated regulations make little sense, and the process of review might lead Congress to
change the relevant statute. 20 7 It is in part for these reasons
that President Clin20 8
review.
congressional
for
enthusiasm
expressed
ton
It is unclear, however, how much this provision would add, since Congress
can already enact legislation to prevent any and all regulations from becoming
law. There are risks as well. A serious problem with congressional review is
that it might, in practice, give well-organized interest groups a chance to bring
pressure to bear on hundreds or even thousands of regulations. In this way it
might increase rather than decrease the problem of factional influence. 20 9 Section 801 would also require Congress to expend limited resources reviewing a
wide range of agency rules, many of which should be uncontroversial.
The competing considerations do not lead to any obvious conclusion. But a
new statutory provision for congressional review adds nothing to Congress'
existing authority. Setting up a formal mechanism for review of regulations is
probably too costly and time-consuming to be worthwhile; narrower "reporting" strategies could accomplish the same goals. Hence section 801 might well
impose costs that are not justified by benefits.
2 10
B. Modest Changes

How might Congress improve the proposals mentioned above? I begin
with some modest changes designed to accomplish Congress' apparent goals in
a more effective manner.
1. Valuation of benefits.
Some theoretical issues. If a substantive supermandate is to operate as a
kind of constitutional amendment to the regulatory state, it seems crucial to
understand what cost-benefit balancing actually entails. Much of the national
debate in the last year involved the value of cost-benefit analysis. Proponents
characterized cost-benefit analysis as a method of disciplining administrative
power through salutary balancing; opponents feared that cost-benefit analysis
cold-heartedly sacrifices human health and life for the sake of mere dollars.
207. The EPA has on several occasions signalled that it would prefer not to issue statutorily required regulation because the costs are high and the benefits low. See, e.g., Impact of Regulatory Reform Proposalson EPA: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Carol Browner, Administrator, EPA).
208. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
209. See Stephen Breyer, The Thomas F. Ryan Lecture: The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72
GEo. L.J. 785, 797 (1984) (arguing that congressional review of regulations favors special interests); cf.
Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhom, CongressionalControl ofAdministrative Regulation: A Study of
Legislative Vetoes, 90 HAgv. L. REv. 1369, 1413-14 (1977) (showing that the legislative veto increased
the power exerted on committees by wealthy and well-organized interest groups).
210. I testified on issues involving regulatory reform before the Senate Judiciary Committee and

the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works, and I have drawn on that testimony for
some of this section.
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But this is at best a caricature. By itself, the notion of cost-benefit analysis
appears very close to empty; everything depends on how costs and benefits are
characterized and on how underlying issues of valuation are resolved. 2 11
Two criticisms can be made of a proposed framework (or supermandate)
for evaluating governmental performance. The first is that the framework is
wrong because it ignores certain important variables, or is founded on an indefensible theory of value. The second criticism is that the framework is incompletely specified, in the sense that its meaning depends on further
subsidiary judgments that have yet to be offered. Cost-benefit analysis is properly subject to the first kind of criticism to the extent that it purports to align
values along the single metric of aggregated private willingness to pay-and
evaluates regulation by reference to that criterion alone. Indeed, regulation
might be founded on citizen judgments that have no clear parallel in aggregated
willingness to pay.2 12 Or it may be rooted in distributive rather than allocative
goals; consider the antidiscrimination laws as possible examples. To the extent
that cost-benefit analysis is rooted in the technical economists' understanding,
it has a great deal to offer, but it cannot capture many appropriate goals of
regulation.
As a political creed, however, the principal problem with cost-benefit analysis is that it is incompletely specified. Its meaning depends on how costs and
benefits are characterized and on how issues of valuation are resolved. Do
equitable concerns enter the cost-benefit calculus? Suppose, for example, that
a certain environmental risk is concentrated among African-Americans. 21 3 Can
a good cost-benefit analysis take this into account? Or suppose that some of
the benefits of regulation are aesthetic. How will these benefits be valued? An
extensive literature explores the valuation of human life.2 14 Though, by itself,
cost-benefit analysis takes no position on the associated controversies, regulators asked to operate under cost-benefit analysis must take some such position.
2. Cost-benefit analysis as a quasi-constitutionalamendment.
With these points in mind we can ask the general question: Would a general requirement of cost-benefit analysis be a sensible supermandate for the
211. The use of a single metric does, however, raise some difficulties. See Pildes & Sunstein,
supra note 35, at 46 (recognizing problem posed by valuation requirement of cost-benefit analysis where
benefit is not easily quantified); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurabilityand Valuation in Lmv, 92 MicH.
L. REv. 779, 782-85 (1994) (noting difficulty of reducing varying notions of value to a single descriptive metric). There is a vast literature on cost-benefit analysis. See generally E.J. MisHAN, CosT-BENEFfrANALYsis: AN INFoRMAL INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 1975); STEVmE
KELMAN, WHAT PtucE INcETIVEs?:
ECONOMIsTS AND = ENVIRoNMENT (1981).

212. Amartya Sen, EnvironmentalEvaluation and Social Choice: Contingent Valuation and the
Market Analogy, 46 JAIANEs ECON. Rzv. 23, 24 (1995). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences
and Politics,20 PHiL. & PUB. As'F. 3 (1991) (arguing that in some cases a democracy should be free to
override private preferences).
213. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994) (requiring agencies to make achieving
environmental justice part of their mission by identifying and addressing programs with disproportionately high adverse effects on minority populations).
214. See generally Viscusi, supra note 41.
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regulatory state? Would such a requirement be like a constitutional amendment, or would it be a modest way of disciplining agency discretion?
The most basic point here is that the modem state includes a diverse array
of regulatory statutes, with diverse legitimate purposes, including but not at all
limited to economic efficiency. Consider the following:
" Many important regulatory states are plausibly understood in terms of economic efficiency; 2 15 they can be seen as efforts to counteract market failures.
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 2 16 and the Toxic
Substances Control Act2 17 are examples. Such statutes may be designed to
overcome an absence of sufficient information; harms to third parties; or col218
lective action problems of various sorts.
" Some statutes are designed to eliminate illegitimate discrimination or what
might be understood as caste-like features in modem society.2 19 Though
some people think that such statutes can be defended on efficiency
grounds, 22 0 their animating impulse has little to do with economic efficiency.
" Some statutes are designed to protect cultural aspirations. 2 21 Examples include measures safeguarding the national parks, encouraging high-quality
programming, and protecting endangered species.
" Some statutes are designed to redistribute to the poor or to others understood
as having a good claim to public help. This is so even though regulation is a
poor tool for this purpose, 22 - and though redistribution may really benefit
well-organized interest groups with little claim to public assistance. The Social Security Act is an obvious example of redistributive law; the Agricultural
Adjustment Act can also be understood in this way, with appropriate qualifications for its interest-group dimensions.
Doubtless other possibilities could be mentioned. 223 The point is that the
highly diverse grounds for federal regulation raise many questions about costbenefit analysis as the only ground for regulation.
215.
216.
217.
218.

I understand this notion in terms of wealth maximization.
7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994).
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994).
For analysis of such objectives of regulation, see STEPmN BRaEYR, REGULATION AND ITS
RProm- 15-35 (1982); ANTHONY OGus, REGLATION: LErA. Fox.M AND ECONOMIC THEORY 15-28
(1994); SUNsTmN, supra note 21, at 41-55.
219. See Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 to 2000h-6 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974e (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988); Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213

(Supp. V 1993).
220. Shelly J. Lundberg and Richard Startz, Private Discriminationand Social Intervention in
Competitive Labor Markets, 73 AM. Ec. Rsv. 340, 340 (1983) (arguing that in some instances the

"competitive equilibrium" may be improved through nondiscriminatory policies).

221. See SuNsramN, supra note 21, at 57-60.
222. See Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. DistributionalEquity in Legal Rulemaking:
Should DistributionalEquity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 AM. EcoN. REv., May 1981,

at 414, 414 (papers and proceedings) (arguing that redistribution is best served by taxation). Sometimes
the expressive function of regulatory statutes is confused with the redistributive function; see ELIZABETH
ANDERSO N, VALUE INETmcs AND EcoNoMIcs 17-43 (1993) (discussing expressive theory).
223. See Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role ofNon-Commodity Values,

92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1537 (1983) (arguing that regulation reflects governmental ends such as "the protection of entitlements, the promotion of production, and the nurture of non-commodity values").
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If it is intended as a quasi-constitutional amendment to the regulatory state,
a cost-benefit supermandate could be understood in at least three different
ways. In its most ambitious form, the mandate would amount to an endorsement of the principle of economic efficiency as the exclusive basis-the "decision criterion"--for interpretation and application of all statutes.2 2 4 This
would be a fundamental change both because it would understand cost-benefit
analysis in a particular way-as a term for the criterion of economic efficiency-and because it would amend statutes that, when enacted, seemed motivated by something other than the efficiency criterion.
If this were the understanding of the supermandate, all of the statutes to
which the supermandate applies would henceforth be understood in efficiency
terms. To say the least, this would be a dramatic shift in national understandings. It would indeed represent a kind of constitutional amendment of the administrative state, rebuilding regulatory efforts on a new foundation. While the
most ambitious reformers in the Senate and the House came close to this view,
none endorsed it explicitly.
Another, less ambitious possibility is to understand the cost-benefit criteria
in efficiency terms, but only for those statutes that were designed to promote
economic efficiency. Under this approach, the supermandate would not alter
the basic understandings of existing statutes. It would instead have a more
modest but nonetheless important goal: imposing a particular understanding of
technocratic rationality on statutes formerly understood and implemented in a
less precise, more ad hoc, and more intuitive way. As we will see, there is
much to be said in favor of this basic approach.
A third and least ambitious possibility is to understand cost-benefit criteria
in a less technical and more common-sensical way, as an invitation to balance a
range of variables under statutes that had formerly been thought to be absolutist
and hence to forbid balancing. On this view, a supermandate would not be so
ambitious as to call for the use of purely economic criteria. It would more
modestly ask administrators to look at costs, or adverse effects, as well as at
benefits. This was probably the goal of the majority of those members of Congress who were in favor of a substantive supermandate. And if the supermandate is understood in these terms, it makes a great deal of sense. As we
will see, the principal objection to such a supermandate is that it is too openended. Congress can and should take steps to clarify it, though-I emphasize-without mandating the efficiency criterion outside of the context of
225
"market failure" statutes.
3. Theory andpractice.
The House and Senate bills offered almost no guidance for characterizing
costs and benefits, and no guidance at all on the crucial issue of how to value
224. EPsTrEN, supra note 31, at 30 (asserting that the efficiency approach to justice "offer[s] the
best justificatory apparatus for demarcating the scope of state power from the area of individual

choice"). Even when economic efficiency is not the basis for the statute, or when benefits cannot be
quantified, it makes sense to require agencies to quantify costs to the extent that this is possible.

225. See text accompanying notes 237-239 infra (discussing the problem of valuing life).
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costs and benefits. For this reason, the provisions look highly substantive but
are in fact largely procedural. Without guidance to constrain valuation, a requirement of cost-benefit analysis is quite open-ended, though certainly not
meaningless. It alerts agencies to the need to balance a range of considerations
and as a procedural requirement, it will affect outcomes. Moreover, courts may
invalidate outcomes that, by general understandings, seem either out of line
with existing practice or too absolutist. 226 Certainly there is a difference between agency behavior under227balancing statutes and agency behavior under
statutes that forbid balancing.
It is possible to conclude that Congress should restrict itself to a call for
cost-benefit analysis and leave the details to agencies. 228 Perhaps Congress
lacks the detailed understanding that would enable it to answer the more specific questions. But if we are at all concemed about administrative discretion,
we should urge greater guidance from the national legislature. 2 29 In any case
the generic bills introduced in the House and Senate would be much improved
if they offered more direction to agencies. I offer two suggestions here.
Qualitativefactors. As I noted in Part I, people care not simply about the
aggregate amount of lives saved, but also about a range of factors involving the
nature of the particular risk. For most people, the most salient contextual features are: (1) whether the risk is catastrophic in nature; (2) whether the risk is
uncontrollable; (3) whether the risk involves irretrievable or permanent losses;
(4) whether the risk is voluntarily incurred; (5) whether the risk is equitably
distributed or concentrated on identifiable, innocent, or traditionally disadvantaged victims; (6) whether the risk is well understood; (7) whether the risk
2 30
would be faced by future generations; and (8) whether the risk is familiar.
Any cost-benefit analysis that Congress requires regulatory agencies to perform should reflect these factors. In developing a cost-benefit formula, Congress should recognize that a purely quantitative or monetary understanding of
costs and benefits is inadequate. The various consequences of regulation ought
not to be thought commensurable along a single metric. 23 1 Any cost-benefit
analysis should be accompanied by a disaggregated, qualitative description of
the consequences of government action, so that Congress and the public can
226. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1215-17, 1229 (5th Cir. 1991) (rejecting an EPA asbestos regulation issued under the Toxic Substance Control Act because the agency
failed to consider less burdensome alternatives).
227. Compare Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994), and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994), with Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993), Delaney Clause, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1988), and Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
228. See AcKEumAN & HAssLER, supra note 14, at 5 (describing flexible agencies that can adapt
to changes in science and newly discovered evidence and arguing that "Congress should content itself
with the most general kinds of policy guidance").
229. See SCHOamROD, supra note 30, at 3-15 (encouraging courts to ban delegation of authority
to administrative agencies and advocating that Congress enact detailed legislation to limit agencies'
power). But see Mashaw, supra note 14, at 97 (arguing against greater guidance and instead advocating
broad delegations of authority to administrative agencies).
230. See, e.g., BREYER, supranote 14, at 16 (noting that "people value different risks differently").
231. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 65 (calling for "disaggregating costs and benefits,
identifying qualitatively different effects, and taking account of effects on diverse groups").
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obtain a fuller picture than the crude and misleadingly precise "bottom line" of
the cost-benefit analysis. 232 This is not at all to deny that it is important to be
precise and quantitative when possible. It is only to say that any "bottom line"
characterization and assessment of costs and benefits will involve judgments
about values, not about science; Congress and the public should see what those
233
judgments are.
I have suggested that regulatory statutes have legitimate and diverse functions and that some of those functions do not involve economic efficiency. For
this reason, the efficiency criterion is inadequate as a complete guide to the
regulatory state. It is therefore best for Congress to understand costs and benefits in the economic fashion only for statutes that are designed to overcome
market failures. And even here, there is room for qualifying the economic
analysis-when, for example, the risk at issue is inequitably distributed, and
when political actors believe that it deserves special attention for that reason.2 4
When the statute does not involve market failure, Congress would still require
cost-benefit balancing as the general background rule; but it should understand
the definition of costs and benefits to be sufficiently broad as to allow administrators to depart from purely economic criteria. Judicial review should be
available to police administrative decisions for reasonableness and consistency.2 35 In the long run, it might be hoped, a common law of regulatory practice might emerge to create rationality and reasonableness where there is now a
high degree of arbitrariness.
The issues I have discussed-the diverse grounds for regulatory statutes,
problems of incommensurability, qualitative distinctions-are probably too
subtle and complex to justify anything like legislative codification. Instead
they suggest that Congress should: (1) enact a general background requirement
232. See ANDERSON, supra note 222, at 191-216 (arguing that consequentialist cost-benefit analysis fails to account for "the diversity of people's values").
233. To account for citizens' value judgments, Senate Bill 343 should be amended as follows:
1. Definition of "benefit." Change section 621(5) to read "the term 'benefit' means the reasonably
identifiable significant benefits, including social, economic, ecological, distributional,and aesthetic
benefits, that are reasonablyexpected to result directly or indirectly from implementation of a rule or an
alternative to a rule." My italicized additions allow agencies to define "benefit" to account for citizen
judgments.
2. Description of benefits and costs. Add the following sentence to section 622(e)(1)(A): "An
agency shall offer a disaggregated description of the relevant costs and benefits, containing an account
of the qualitative differences, if any, among the costs and benefits at stake." This provision permits a
more comprehensive examination of the full cost-benefit landscape.
3. Diverse cost and benefit factors. Add the following section, 622(e)(1)(C): "Where practicable,
the agency shall, in evaluating and comparing costs and benefits, consider public judgments about how
best to assess relevant risks, including whether the risks under consideration are involuntarily incurred,
likely to affect future generations, potentially catastrophic, especially dreaded, irreversible, or inequitably distributed." The list is not exhaustive, but does provide agencies an opportunity to account for
diverse public judgments.

234. This qualification should not be used to allow private groups to skew economic analyses in
their preferred directions. It should instead provide room for a formal channel to qualify the economic
analysis when, for example, poor people are peculiarly at risk.

235. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1220-22 (5th Cir. 1991) (discussing whether the EPA regulatory decision had a "reasonable basis").
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of cost-benefit balancing, 236 with a relatively open-ended understanding of
both costs and benefits; (2) permit agencies to understand cost-benefit analysis
in a way that best fits with the particular statutory scheme; (3) impose a costeffectiveness or "least cost" requirement as part of the supermandate; and (4)
require more technical cost-benefit balancing on a statute-by-statute basis,
when there is a considered legislative judgment that the statute is a response to
a market failure, economically defined. Congress should, however, attempt to
impose some constraints on agency valuations and tools, as I will now discuss.
Floors and ceilings. It is of course troublesome to assign dollar values to
life, partly for the reasons I have sketched. But since tradeoffs of multiple
kinds are inevitable, it may be best for Congress to set out some guidelines,
including floors and ceilings governing expenditures, without pretending to say
how much a life is "really worth." In light of the diversity of regulated risks,
no single number would make sense for valuing life. 237 But it may make sense
to set benchmark standardsof, for example, $10 million per life saved as the
presumptive maximum amount and $3 million as the presumptive minimum.
These benchmarks might be accompanied by explicit permission for agencies
to select a lower or higher amount if the agency can explain that special circumstances call for it.
There is a crudeness, however, in the very notion of "dollars per life saved."
A well-functioning regulatory state should not be interested in how many lives
are saved, but in how many statistical years, or how many decently liveable
statistical years, are added by regulation. 23 8 An agency would do better to save
forty statistical years than it would to save three, even though, through both
steps, it might be taken to have "saved a life." Where resources are limited, it
makes sense to devote resources to saving people who have the most good
years ahead. This judgment may appear controversial, but it seems supported
by common sense and economic criteria.239 Hence Congress should probably
set floors and ceilings not for lives saved but for life-years saved, with permission to depart on the basis of justifications that are articulated publicly and are
reasonable on the merits. For life-years, a presumptive ceiling of $500,000
might be a reasonable place to start. Of course any floors and ceilings should
be accompanied with adjustments for inflation.
Without a figure per life or life-year saved, agencies effectively have discretion to weigh costs and benefits however they wish. Congress should offer
some guidelines to achieve consistency across agency lines. At a minimum
Congress should require agencies to be explicit about their valuations, so that
these valuations will be subject to legislative and public oversight and review.
236. Such balancing can be handled with some fairly straightforward language. See note 233
supra.
237. See VALuING HEA.TH FOR POLICY (George Tolley, Donald Kenkel, & Robert Fabian eds.,
1994) (discussing the diversity of valuations suggested in contingent valuation studies).
238. For a discussion of quality-adjusted life years, see Richard Zeckhauser and Donald Shepard,
Were Now for Saving Lives?, 40 LAW & CorrEw. PRoBs. 5 (Autumn 1976); Pildes and Sunstein,
supranote 35, at 83-86 (asserting that quality-adjusted life years is a promising method for incorporating lay perspectives into regulation).
239. Pildes and Sunstein, supra note 35, at 83-86.

HeinOnline -- 48 Stan. L. Rev. 295 1995-1996

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:247

4. Substitute risks.
We have seen that there is a pervasive problem in risk regulation, one that
is only now receiving public attention, and one that was not adequately addressed in the proposals before the 104th Congress.2 40 The problem occurs
when the diminution of one risk simultaneously increases another risk.24 1 For
example, fuel economy standards, designed partly to reduce environmental
risks to life and health, may make automobiles less safe, thus increasing risks to
life and health. Regulations designed to control the spread of AIDS and hepatitis among health care providers may actually cost lives by increasing the costs
of health care, and thus making health care less widely available.2 42 Regulation of nuclear power may make nuclear power safer; but by increasing costs,
such regulation promotes reliance on other energy sources, such as coal-fired
power plants, which carry risks of their own.2 43 The general problem is
ubiquitous.
As I have noted, no provision in the current proposals deals directly with
this problem. Congress should consider a new provision to this effect:
"(1) Agencies shall ensure, to the extent feasible, that regulations do not
create countervailing risks that are greater than those of regulated risks.
(2) This section shall not apply if it is inconsistent with the provisions of the
enabling statute pursuant to which the agency is acting."
Such a provision would require agencies to ensure that overall risks are not
increased. It would not fundamentally change current law. But it would be a
modest step toward a more coordinated treatment of risk. 244
C. Ambitious Goals
Thus far I have offered modest suggestions that build on existing proposals.
Three more ambitious strategies would accomplish a great deal more.
240. H.R. 1022 does contain a reference to substitute risks in section 105, but agencies are required only to 'consider' such risks. H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 105(4).
241. See Breyer, supra note 14, at 17 (explaining that the ban on EDB, a grain fumigant, could
lead farmers to switch to other, more dangerous fumigants); Graham & Wiener, supra note 61, at 5-25;
Sunstein, supra note 61; text accompanying notes 59-70 supra (discussing harmful, unintended consequences of regulations).
242. In American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1993), the court upheld an
OSHA regulation, but commented on OSHA's failure to follow the "universal precautions" requirement.
Id. at 825. Judge Posner explains:

OSHA also exaggerated the number of lives likely to be saved by the rule by ignoring lives
likely to be sacrificed by it, since the increased cost of medical care, to the extent passed on to
consumers, will reduce the demand for medical care, and some people may lose their lives as a
result.
Id. at 826.
243. See Kathleen C. Reilly, Global Benefits Versus Local Concerns: The Needfor a Bird's Eye
View of Nuclear Energy, 70 IND. L.J. 679, 705-06 (1995) (noting that emissions from coal-fired power
plants contribute significantly to greenhouse gases and to the air pollution which causes acid rain).
244. For a more detailed discussion, see Jonathon Baert Wiener & John D. Graham, Resolving
Risk Tradeoffs, in RisK VERsus RisK, supra note 61, at 220-40.
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1. Rank risks and reallocate resources to the most severe problems and
increase the executive's role in priority setting.
As Justice Breyer suggests, a statute could give the executive some degree
of authority to divert public and private resources from small environmental
problems to large ones, ensuring greater cost-effectiveness in government and
better priority-setting. 245 There are some dangers with this proposal-a small
group of bureaucrats should not have the authority to decide on basic social
priorities. Nonetheless, a greater degree of executive priority-setting would
make sense.
Justice Breyer's approach should be qualified by remembering that people
are legitimately concerned with the various contextual factors discussed
above-the voluntariness of the risk, its potentially catastrophic character,
whether it is especially dreaded, whether it is equitably distributed, and so
forth. 24 6 Efforts at better priority-setting received some modest attention in the
24 7
104th Congress; but the proposals were not very ambitious.
2. Allow plans from the private sector that show greaterand more
cost-effective reductions.
Often the problem with federal regulation is that the government lacks
knowledge of the least expensive means of producing the preferred regulatory
end. If the private sector were permitted to select the means, it could do so far
more cheaply. This point has been recognized in Europe and Japan, under the
general rubric of "environmental contracting." 248 In the Netherlands, for example, the government has experimented with comprehensive, multimedia environmental targets for pollution reduction and has developed strategies to
work with industry groups to achieve overall goals. 249 As part of the agreement with industry groups, the government agrees to waive otherwise applicable pollutant-by-pollutant regulations, and to limit changes in requirements
during the length of the contract period.
In the United States, the EPA has taken modest steps in the same direction.
For example, the EPA and Amoco concluded that a plantwide approach would
better decrease chemical releases than the existing command-and-control system. 5 0 Similarly, under the Clean Air Act, companies can, in essence, "contract out" of technology-based regulations for six years if they achieve a 90
245. BREYER, supra note 14, at 18-19; see AcKE mAN & HASsI.ER, supra note 14, at 8 (noting that
environmental law "proved to be especially fertile ground" for agency experimentation).
246. See text accompanying note 230 supra.
247. See, eg., 141 CONG. REc. S9836-38 (daily ed. July 13, 1995) (Roth-Biden modified amend-

ment No. 1507).
248. See MEMNEL & STmwART, supra note 82, at 420-22; see generally ENviRONmENTAL CONTRACTs AND CovENANTs: NEav INSTRUMENTS FOR A REALISTIC ENvIRmOmmrNAL PoLICY? (Jan M. van

Dunn6 ed., 1993).
249. See Francis H. Irwin, An IntegratedFrameworkfor PreventingPollution and Protectingthe
Environment, 22 ENvrL. L. 1, 29 (1992) (discussing Netherlands' plan); MENELL & ST WART, supra
note 82, at 421-22.
250. MENELL & STwART,supra note 82, at 421.
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in toxic pollutants before the EPA promulgates relevant
percent reduction
25
regulations. '
Under most federal statutes, however, the EPA cannot approve private
plans as substitutes for public mandates, even if the plans promise better results
for less money. Congress should move in the direction of allowing private
substitutes, so long as government monitoring is maintained. 2 52 A provision of
the June discussion draft of the Dole bill endorsed this strategy, but because its
relationship to other statutes was quite ambiguous, it was unclear whether2the
53
provision would enable agencies to waive existing statutory requirements.
3.

Regulate with incentives.

We have seen that command-and-control regulation can be highly dysfunctional. Sometimes relevant statutes forbid agencies from choosing incentivebased strategies even where such strategies would be more effective. Congress
might move away from command-and-control regulation by enacting a statute
stating: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an agency shall be permitted to use economic incentives to induce industries to eliminate or reduce
risks, if it can show that these methods will produce at least equivalent benefits
in a more cost-effective manner."2 54 Of course, such a provision could increase
the risk of litigation initiated by self-interested private groups seeking to stall
desirable regulation.2 55 It could also allow agencies unenthusiastic about regulatory mandates to proceed with less effective means of achieving compliance.
But despite the potential for abuse, the problems with existing command-andcontrol processes-excessive costs and insufficient regulatory benefits25 6-are
probably sufficient to make it worthwhile to move in this direction.
V.

POSSIBLE

FuTuR~s

In the area of regulatory reform, and particularly in the context of health,
safety, and the environment, a number of creative ideas are percolating
throughout the nation. These ideas have already had effects on legislation; they
will have increasingly significant consequences inthe coming years. Using
251. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
252. The much-criticized Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 &

Supp. V 1993), included such a feature. Id. § 1281(h); see also H.R. 879, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(allowing EPA Administrator to fund innovative projects which used cost-effective sewer overflow
technologies).
253. 141 CONG. Rac. S9542-43 (daily ed. June 30, 1995) (containing performance-based standards which allow the regulated entity discretion to determine the best method of compliance with
specific requirements).
254. PreparedStatement ofJonathanB. Wiener,Associate Professor,School ofLaw & School of
the Environment,Duke University, Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, FED. NEws SEnv., Mar. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curaws File (discussing the
role of market-based performance incentives in the reform of health, safety, and environmental regulatory policy).

255. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical:The Rationalefor
Technology-Based Regulation, 1981 DuK L.J. 729, 737-38, available in WESTLAW, JLR Database
(discussing a situation in which eleven asbestos manufacturers found it more cost-effective to pay $640
per hour in legal fees to challenge OSHA's air quality standards than to comply with the standards).
256. See text accompanying notes 49-58 supra.
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environmental regulation as an example, I organize those ideas into four general frameworks: cost-benefit analysis, pollution prevention, free market environmentalism, and democratic environmentalism. The following table is
designed to provide capsule descriptions:
TABLE 5
Five Approaches to Regulatory Reform
1970s Environmentalism

Cost-Benefit
Analysis

Pollution Preven- Free Market
Democratic
tion
Environmentalism Environmentalism

Perceived
Problems

excessive pollution; power of
industry

refusal to balance; absolutism

technological
fixes; end of the
pipe controls;
power of industry

Approved Measures

national ambient
air quality standards; technological requirements

Disapproved
Measures

common law

Preferred Soluions

command-andcontrol; best
available technology; technology
forcing
hostility

Attitude Toward
CBA

Attitude Toward hostility
Economic Inentives

Normative Ideal

strict enforcement
of statutory mandates

absence of welldefined property
rights; environmentalism as a
form of socialism; factionalism

command-andcontrol; poor priority-setting;
absence of public
deliberation;
interest group
power
Toxic Substances elimination of
common law; the Emergency PlanControl Act;
lead (CAA);
takings approach ning and ConFIFRA
asbestos rule
to environmental sumer Right to
(TSCA)
regulation; ef.
Know Act;
wetlands protec- National Environion and endan- mental Policy
gered species act Act; acid deposireform
tion provisions of
CBA
Delaney Clause; tinkering with
Clean Air Act
best available
national ambient current cars; tech- especially unholy technology in
air quality stan- nological fixes
coalitions
CAA and CWVA;
dards; technolfor water polluSuperfund; comogy-based
tion
mon law
regulation
balancing require- solar energy;
create property
economic incenments
electric cars;
rights; watch the ives in the form
clean fuels; elimi- market work
of "polluters pay"
nating "root
and emissions
cause"
trading
of course
suspicion, since better than status potentially
favorable
CBA need not
quo, but worse
favorable, but
produce pollution than real markets; emphasizes that
prevention
threatens to be
analysis should
government dicta- be based on judgtion of outcomes ments, not just
based on inade- aggregated willquate information ingness to pay;
points to differences between lay
and expert judgments
favorable insofar suspicion
favorable, but
favorable insofar
as they minimize
tany questions, as they limit faccosts
since there is a
tional power,
large government focus democracy
role in setting
on right quesprices and/or
tions, and put a
quantities; under- premium on
stands "ecoacquiring infornomic" incentives mation
as creation of real
markets
good balancing of clean pollutionconsumer sover- well-informed
relevant variables; free technologies, eignity, based on public judgments
maximizing social with "deep" ecol- maximizing wel- based on people's
welfare
ogy and spiritual fare through
ideals and convicvalues as possible aggregating pri- tions
animating ideals; vate preferences
nature as a source for environmental
of value
and other goods
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Cost-Benefit Balancing

One possibility, captured in many of the current proposals, is to shift in the
direction of cost-benefit balancing for all statutes. Many current statutes forbid
57
balancing and call for absolutism. Such an approach is not easy to justify.2
Thus the various statutes that are defined in terms of health or technology
might be amended to call for cost-benefit analysis.2 58 As we have seen, this
shift-in the direction of a cost-benefit state-responds to several current
problems with regulation. Moreover, it is important to offer some criteria by
which to monitor regulatory performance, and cost-benefit analysis is probably
the best available technique for embarking on a form of "national performance
review."
By itself, however, a shift towards cost-benefit analysis would be only a
modest improvement over the status quo. We have seen that, as an abstraction,
cost-benefit analysis lacks a theory of value. If this defect is remedied in the
economist's fashion, by rooting cost-benefit analysis in the economic criterion
of private willingness to pay, it becomes quite controversial and indeed hard to
defend as a global approach. Environmental amenities are not best valued by
2
aggregating private willingness to pay. 59
Apart from the question of valuation, engrafting a cost-benefit requirement
onto current law is only a modest shift; it does not represent a sufficiently
fundamental change from the system of command-and-control regulation. Because the calculation of both costs and benefits can be enormously difficult,
requiring agencies to make the necessary inquiries will impose large informational burdens on government. A general requirement of cost-benefit analysis
allows legislators to take credit for "getting the regulators under control" without making the hard choices. Such a credit-claiming device hardly substitutes
for reinvented government.
Imagine-to take a rough analogy-that the Soviet Union had decided in,
say, 1986 to replace an "absolutist" five-year plan for producing wheat with
another five-year plan, one that better recognized the need for balancing competing variables. This step might have been an improvement; but a five-year
257. One such provision is the Delaney Clause, 21 U.S.C. § 348(C)(3)(A) (1988), which forbids
the use of carcinogens in food additives. Congress has enacted several bans on cost-benefit balancing.

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(c) (1988) (mandating standard for nitrogen dioxide concentrations); see also
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7475(a)(4), 7503(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See generally National Ambient Air Quality Standard Regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-.12 (1994).
258. Critics charge cost-benefit analysis with assuming a misleading wealth of knowledge. See
Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and
"Fine-Tuning" RegulatoryReforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1273-75, 1279 (1985) (criticizing proponents of cost-benefit analysis for their unrealistic assumption that all environmental conditions and control strategies can be known). It is of course possible that cost-benefit analysis would itself fail costbenefit analysis; thus technology-based approaches could be justified as a response to government's lack
of information and proper incentives. Similarly, it is possible that health-based standards can be justified by their aspirational and political values-providing a benchmark to which even dirty places may
aspire. These ideas do not, however, argue against the background rule I defend above. See text accompanying notes 226-244 supra.
259. See ANZERsoN, supra note 222, at 195-96 (noting difficulty in using private willingness to
pay); text accompanying notes 272-276 infra.

HeinOnline -- 48 Stan. L. Rev. 300 1995-1996

January 1996]

LEGISLATIVE FOREWORD

plan based on governmental balancing is no less a five-year plan than one
based on governmental absolutism. 260 Governmental dictation of outcomes
based on cost-benefit analysis is better than governmental dictation based on
absolutism, but neither is ideal. A system in which agencies decide what is to
be done only after considering all costs and benefits is likely to be time-consuming and will inevitably produce large-scale errors. Such a system imposes
enormous data collection requirements on agencies and also forces them to
make difficult, and hardly scientific, judgments about basic values. This approach may well be attractive to members of Congress seeking reelection, but it
is not a great deal better than the status quo.
In fact it would be easy to imagine a generation of dreary cycles with respect to regulatory reform. In those cycles, conservatives might call for more
balancing of costs and benefits, more procedures, and fewer deadlines for administrators; liberals would then argue against cost-benefit analysis and for
health-based or technology-based standards, fewer procedures, citizen suits for
regulatory beneficiaries, and stricter deadlines; conservatives, a few years later,
would seek greater procedural requirements and more attention to costs; liberals would respond with the familiar litany; and so on until, say 2050.
Although this cyclical model is not a bad description of the regulatory debates since 1980, its continuation would represent an enormous failure of imagination and creativity. It would fix American policy in the outmoded debates of
the early 1970s, before the outpouring of learning that makes the "more" or
"less" debate seem so unhelpful. A cost-benefit state ought not to content itself
with governmental specification of outcomes after governmental cost-benefit
judgments have been made. It ought instead to create incentives for nongovernmental actors to generate information and to produce outcomes based on
incentives generated by democratic judgments.
B.

Pollution Prevention

In the last decade many people have enthusiastically embraced "pollution
prevention" as the regulatory strategy of choice. 261 On this view, government
should eliminate pollutants from the market rather than require pretreatment or
impose technological requirements to reduce the harmful effects of pollutants.
Prominent examples of pollution prevention include the elimination of lead
from gasoline; the phaseout of chlorofluorocarbons; government bans on DDT,
260. This is a Hayekian point based on the government's informational limitations. Thus markets
can be justified partly on the ground that individuals have far better relevant information than does
government. See F.A. HAYEK, Tim CoNsTuToN oF LmERTY 106-120 (1960).
261. See BARRY Co.NoN-R, MAKING PEACE VrrH m PLAT 189-90 (1990) (asserting that
pollution prevention is the only effective environmental strategy); Barry Commoner, Failure of the Environmental Effort, 18 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,195, 10,195 (1988) (noting that the lesson of the environmental effort is that pollution can be prevented). See also Symposium, Pollution Prevention, 29 GA. L. REv.
313 (1995) (surveying issues in pollution prevention); Remarks of President at Rego Event, Mar. 16,
1995, available in WESTLAW, Pres-Daily Database (President Clinton's statement announcing the
launch of EPA project to reduce pollution).
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PCBs, and asbestos 262; the shift from high-polluting fossil fuels to clean, renewable energy sources; and restrictions on mercury pollution in the Great
Lakes and phosphate pollution in local rivers.
Why is pollution prevention so attractive to so many people? Enthusiasts
contend that by preventing the production or use of certain pollutants, government can make much more progress in reducing pollution than it can by imposing technological controls or fixes. 263 The proper analogy, it is said, is to the
contrast between prevention and cure. We know that cures tend to be both
more expensive and less effective than preventive measures. American government has focused on cures; it should shift to prevention. From this perspective,
the basic cause of environmental degradation is current technology, above all
fossil fuels and modem cars. At the same time, the capacity of technology to
diminish its own environmental damage is rapidly becoming exhausted. Instead of imposing decreasingly effective technological fixes, would it not be
better to take steps to ensure that environmentally harmful substances are not
produced at all?
Often the answer to this question is affirmative; often pollution prevention
is both feasible and appropriate. 264 But as a global approach, pollution prevention is inadequate. 265 In some cases pollution prevention would impose extremely high costs-including environmental costs-for little environmental or
other gain. Recall here that a federal court of appeals invalidated one of the
most ambitious of the recent pollution prevention strategies-the ban on the
manufacture and use of asbestos--on the ground that: (a) the benefits of the
ban could not, in many sectors, be shown to justify the costs and (b) the ban on
asbestos could itself produce a variety of environmental and health-related
266
problems stemming from the use of environmentally inferior substitutes.
This example can be duplicated in many other contexts. Indeed the goal of
pollution prevention, if taken literally, would be a social disaster. For example,
an immediate and wholesale shift to electric cars might seem the best way to
prevent air pollution from motor vehicles. But electric cars are now extremely
expensive, and the costs, for workers and consumers, of a ban on contemporary
automobiles would plainly be excessive. In fact, electric cars produce environ-

262. But see Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1215-17 (5th Cir. 1991) (invalidating EPA ban on "for all practical purposes, all present and future uses of asbestos").
263. See CommoNER, supra note 261, at 41-44 (concluding that the best environmental results are
achieved by pollution prevention rather than control technologies).
264. Hence the idea is playing a large role within EPA. See 60 Fed. Reg. 23,928 (1995) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1) (detailing EPA's agenda for a comprehensive reevaluation of its rfles); SciaNcE ADvisoRy BOARD, EPA, No. SAB-EC-90-021, RFDUcINo RISK: SErr7No PRIORmEs AND SmaTA'GIES FOR Evrmo~mEaNrAL PROTECnON 22 (1990) (recommending pollution prevention). Some Clean
Water Act proposals have also focused on pollution prevention strategies. See, e.g., 141 CONG. Rac.
ES10 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1995) (statement of Rep. Oberstar).

265. See ViLDAVSKy, supra note 214, at 77-103 (arguing for a version of cure rather than
prevention).

266. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1220-22 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that EPA
presented insufficient evidence to justify asbestos ban).
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mental harms of their own 267 -a potential problem for many pollution prevention strategies.
In these circumstances, pollution prevention is sometimes worse than costbenefit analysis or economic incentives. By imposing a direct cost on polluting
activity, economic incentives can identify the circumstances in which prevention or cure makes the most sense. For example, fees imposed on the production of sulfur dioxide may lead some companies to eliminate sulfur dioxide; in
any case the judgment would be left to (appropriately constrained) market
forces. Alternatively, cost-benefit analysis might show that pollution prevention is not worthwhile.
The appropriate conclusion is that pollution prevention is often a good regulatory strategy, but that it cannot be adopted in all or even most contexts.
Whether it is the best solution depends on the pollutant in question, the available substitutes, and the effects of the preventative approach.
C.

Free Market Environmentalism

Much creative thought has been dedicated to using "free markets" as a
mechanism for promoting environmental and other goals. 268 To free market
advocates, the problem of environmental degradation stems from a simple fact:
the absence of secure property rights in environmental amenities. 2 69 The creation of secure property rights tends to reduce environmental problems.
There is much truth to this suggestion, and there is considerable promise to
the resulting proposals. If environmental assets were owned, so that owners
faced the full costs of excessive development, it is likely that excessive pollution would be prevented. In many settings, free market environmentalism
points in promising directions. Consider, for example, possible amendments to
the Endangered Species Act, related to proposals introduced in the 104th Congress. In its current form, the Act creates difficult problems for any landowner
who discovers that his land contains a critical habitat for an endangered or
threatened species. Discovery of such a habitat subjects the property to a range
of limitations. 270 Hence a landowner has an incentive either to lie about the
facts or to proceed with development as rapidly as possible to avoid the constraints of the Endangered Species Act. It would be far better to use market
approaches so that landowners are rewarded rather than punished by a discov27 1
ery that threatened or endangered species need their land.
267. See Lori A. Burkhart, Benefits of Low-Emission Vehicles Uncertain, FORT., Dec. 1, 1994, at
34 (doubting the ability of low emission vehicles to improve air quality and energy security).
268. See generally Symposium, FreeMarket Environmentalism: The Role of the Market in EnvironmentalProtection, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 297 (1992) (surveying approaches to environmental
protection, including market-based solutions).
269. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & DON.ALD R. LEAL, FREE MAuc=r EN VRoNM NTA.SM 20-23
(1991) (proposing an approach to environmental protection based on property rights).
270. See EpsrarN, supra note 31, at 291-93.
271. See EndangeredSpecies Act: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Environmentand Public
Works, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995) available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File (statement of
Gregg Easterbrook, author) (advocating the creation of private preservation firms that would operate on
a free market basis); see also Incentives for PrivateLandowners Under the EndangeredSpecies Act:
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For two reasons, however, free market environmentalism is an incomplete
solution. First, it is not always possible to assign ownership rights. Consider,
for example, the problems posed by acid deposition, the greenhouse effect, and
the destruction of the ozone layer. Economic incentives, based on market
thinking, may be preferable to command-and-control measures; but it is difficult to imagine a system in which private ownership rights are fully allocated.
The second reason is more theoretical. Free market environmentalism depends on the view that the market paradigm should be deemed normative for
purposes of environmental protection. Thus the key question becomes how
much people, as consumers, would pay for environmental amenities. 272 The
answer to that question defines people's "choices" and "values." Indeed, for
free market environmentalists it is hard to imagine how choices and values
might otherwise be understood.
But it is wrong to take private choices, expressed in the market domain, as
definitional of preferences. 273 Private willingness to pay in the market domain
reflects a particular setting; it does not reflect global choices or valuations.2 74
The choices people make are a function of the particular role in which they find
themselves. As consumers, people make choices that diverge from those they
make as citizens. The appropriate kind and degree of environmental protection
raise issues that should be discussed by citizens offering reasons for one or
another view. This democratic conception of environmental protection competes with the market-oriented view. Of course, a democratic approach to environmental law will use market incentives in many contexts, partly because of
the advantages of market incentives on simple democratic grounds.
Moreover, private willingness to pay is undergirded by social norms and
existing habits, and these should probably be changed; indeed, in the environmental context they had better be.2 75 Consider, for example, the issues posed
by littering and recycling. Social norms with respect to these issues have
shifted dramatically in the last generation. Thus the act of recycling is now, in
many communities, taken for granted, where a decade ago that same act was
perceived as odd or fanatical. Or consider smoking. A principal issue here is
whether smoking is promoted or undermined by social norms. Large reductions in smoking among African-American teenagers appear to have been
Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Environment and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on
MerchantMarineand Fisheries,103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) availablein LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst
File [hereinafter Hearings](statement of Robert Thornton, attorney, Nossaman, Guthner, Knox & Elliot)
(advocating a "Habitat Transaction Method" that awards conservation credits to landowners who preserve or enhance habitats).
272. ANDEDsoN & LEAL, supra note 269, at 3, 147-51; see also Viscusi, supra note 41, at 19-23
(exploring private willingness to pay as a method of valuation).
273. See Sen, supranote 212, at 23-24 (questioning the view that the individual in a free market
best addresses environmental evaluation).

274. See generally CAss R. SusTan , FP.aa MARars AND SociAL JusTicE (forthcoming 1996);
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 CoLum. L. Rav. (forthcorning 1996); Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function ofLaw, 144 U. PA. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996).
275. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 943
(1995) (exploring how law helps to construct social reality and the techniques used by government to
construct social meaning); Sunstein, supra note 274.
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brought about by changes in social norms. 276 A prime purpose of environmental law is to shape norms and habits. The central weakness of free market
environmentalism is that it removes this issue from the agenda.
D. DemocraticEnvironmentalism
A final approach would base regulatory law on people's reflective judgments, as citizens, about their basic goals. On this view, the most significant
problems in the current system consist of interest-group power, myopic responses to sensationalist anecdotes, and inadequate information. A market-oriented understanding of the regulation is inadequate because it fails to provide a
forum for public deliberation. Similarly, a purely technocratic conception is
inadequate because it devalues the need to rely on people's reflective judgments. 2 77 More specifically, the technocratic approach fails to reflect the various qualitative factors that influence public judgments about risk-whether a
risk is voluntarily incurred, equitably distributed, potentially catastrophic, especially dreaded, and so forth.2 78 And as we have seen, there is a difference
between the judgments people make as citizens and those they make as consnmers; in principle, the former are the relevant judgments with respect to public policy.
A good model for democratic environmentalism is the Emergency Planning
and Community Involvement Right-to-Know Act,2 79 which requires the creation and publication of a list of release levels for each of more than three hundred toxic chemicals that exceed threshold quantities. 280 The result is a Toxic
Release Inventory, an annual EPA report of toxic chemical releases that summarizes the relevant information. The publicity has two desirable consequences. First, the Toxic Release Inventory gives states and localities the
information needed to decide whether to act at the governmental level. The
Toxic Release Inventory thereby spurs decentralized political action. Second,
public reaction to the publication leads many companies to pledge to make
voluntary reductions. Thus the Monsanto Corporation pledged a ninety percent
cut within four years, and AT&T established a goal of eliminating all toxic air
emissions by the turn of the century; many other companies have produced new
8
waste reduction initiatives as well. 2 '
276. See Abigail Trafford, Winners & Losers: A Look at the Past Ten Years, WASH. PosT, Jan. 3,

1995, availablein WESTLAW, Alinews Database (noting a 51% drop in smoking among black teens,
but a 14% increase among white teens); see also Richard J. Bonnie & Barbara S. Lynch, Time to Up the
Ante in the War on Smoking, Issuas Sci. & TEcH., Sept. 22, 1994, at 33 (noting a decline in daily

smoking among African Americans from 16% in 1980 to 4A% in 1993).
277. This is the drawback of Breyer's proposal, which offers a "better-government or bureaucratic
solution" to the problem of risk regulation. BREYEPR, supra note 14, at 59
278. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 88.
279. Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,00111,050 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

280. Id. at § 11,023.
281.

PERcrvAL Er A., supra note 57, at 624-26.
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For democratic environmentalists, 28 2 much of the promise of economic incentives lies in the fact that they promise to reduce interest-group power by
removing attention from the question of means, which is so clearly a recipe for
interest-group struggle. Economic incentives also have the advantage of focusing the public's attention on the right questions. 28 3 Hence the acid deposition
provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act are a model for the future because they
reflect a democratic judgment about outcomes. 28 4 The much-criticized (and
internationally much-imitated) National Environmental Policy Act285 is also a
model from the democratic point of view, insofar as it requires the disclosure of
environmental consequences before the government can act,2 86 and in that
sense spurs political (but not judicial 28 7) safeguards. It is especially important
to ensure that public judgments are adequately informed. A system in which
and sensationalistic anecdotes only parodies
the public responds to misleading
28 8
democratic aspirations.
Of course these are stylized discussions of abstractions that must be applied
to complex policy initiatives. It is best to approach particular problems in a
pragmatic and experimental manner. All four approaches have something to
offer, and they can be combined in different ways to arrive at the best solution.
In cases involving dangerous substances with good substitutes, the argument
for pollution prevention is overwhelming. Where private ownership is possible, free market environmentalism may well be preferable to the alternatives,
notwithstanding the theoretical objections offered above. In some situations,
cost-benefit balancing at the government level is unavoidable. We may believe
that for reasons associated with democratic environmentalism, a strong commitment to the protection of endangered species makes sense. But even if this
is so, it may be best to use market-like instruments to accomplish democratic
goals-through, for example, "habitat credits" that reward rather than punish
that their land supports the continued existence of an
landowners who discover
2 89
endangered species.
Some of the most promising modem initiatives are rooted in democratic
judgments, but at the same attempt time to harness private initiative and market
forces in the interest of those veryjudgments. In this way it may be possible to
282. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, 37 STAN. L.

REv. L. 1333, 1341-55 (1985) (arguing for use of marketable pollution rights to enhance democratic
quality of environmental policy making).

283. See id. at 1353.
284. But see Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution,ForcingDemocracy, 14 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 300,
318 (1995) (challenging the view that the incentive-based regulatory strategy of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 promotes democratic deliberation about environmental protection).
285. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. V

1993).
286. Id. § 4332(C).
287. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (per
curiam) (holding that so long as an agency follows NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a
court is to make sure that the agency considered environmental consequences).
288. See WXLDAvsKY, supra note 85, at 151, 375-94. For example, Superfund is a product of the
less than fully informed public outcry surrounding the Love Canal scandal. Subsequent studies suggest
that the risks to humans from hazardous waste dumps are actually very low. See id. at 160.
289. See HAm~iNos, supra note 271.
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accommodate both free market and democratic environmentalism, nominally
opposed foundations that could make a creative rapprochement. This is the
direction in which the most productive reforms might lead. They would produce a kind of cost-benefit state, but one that is neither purely technocratic nor
entirely founded on the willingness-to-pay criterion. In such a state, regulatory
outcomes would be founded on value judgments that are reflective, reasoned,
and democratically developed. An approach of this kind would synthesize
emerging enthusiasm for technocratic tools and for decreased cost with the basic American commitment to deliberative democracy.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The election of the 104th Congress, together with the Contract with
America, signals that the nation may be in the midst of a constitutional moment. At the very least the 104th Congress raised more fundamental questions
about the national government than at any time since the New Deal. Most of
the key initiatives were passed by the House but floundered in the Senate. The
public never authoritatively committed itself to such fundamental change, and
hence the constitutional moment, though signalled, failed to occur. Whether it
will happen in the future depends on the judgments of the American peopleon whether those judgments will be made with the firmness that American
institutions require.
Even if regulatory reform does not become part of a constitutional moment,
the nation is embarking increasingly on the project of assessing government
performance by asking whether the benefits justify the costs. The regulatory
state is becoming something like a cost-benefit state; this is an unmistakable
feature of public life in many institutions of American government. In light of
the chaotic and uncoordinated character of modem regulation, this is in many
ways a salutary development. But it is only a start, above all because the abstract ideas of "cost" and "benefit" need to be specified by some theory of
value. In the 104th Congress, legislative debates over regulatory reform were
mostly procedural and unimaginative, trapped in an increasingly pointless discussion of whether "more" or "less" regulation is desirable. In the end, almost
nothing happened.
To be sure, some proposals would have improved the modem regulatory
state by reducing regulatory excesses and encouraging better priority-setting.
In addition, the deliberative process of the Senate reflected a learning process
in which poorly conceived provisions were deleted 290 and better alternatives
were proposed. 291 But for the most part, these proposals were far less sophisti290. See for example, the Glenn bill, which preserved the EPA's Toxic Release Inventory program in its entirety; this bill was defeated by Senate Republicans. Ronald Begley, FrustrationsMount
in Effort to Scale Back Regulations, CHEMIcAL WL-, July 26, 1995, at 9. See also Proposalto Revive
Regulatory Bill Gets Cool Reception from Dole, Industry, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 152, at D-16

(Aug. 8, 1995).
291.

One example is the Roth-Biden Amendment. 141 CONG. REc.

S9836-37

1995).
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cated and creative than those that emerged from the executive branch, including
the "reinventing government" working groups.
A general lesson emerges from this phenomenon. In the last fifteen years,
the executive branch has embraced a form of cost-benefit analysis for specific
purposes-to promote better priority-setting, to move towards market-oriented
tools, to exempt de minimis risks, to attend to informed public judgments, to
foster voluntary and least-cost compliance, and to focus on ultimate results
rather than methods and processes. To be sure, there is much to criticize in the
efforts of the executive branch. 292 But all in all, they are quite promisingcertainly more so than the various bills that attracted so much attention in the
104th Congress.
As we have seen, balancing is preferable to absolutism. The point is especially important in light of the fact that with respect to the protection of human
health, absolutism may actually be counterproductive and hence far from what
it seems. 293 But cost-benefit balancing is an abstract idea that needs specification, and it is insufficient to graft a supermandate of "balancing" on top of a
structure of command-and-control regulation. Future congressional debate
over the regulatory state should not remain frozen in a discussion of whether
regulation imposes excessively high costs (it surely does) or whether more
should be done to protect people from a range of harms, including risks to life
and health (it surely should). Too many proposals in the 104th Congress reflected too little of the learning of the last twenty years of experience. Embodying instead the unhelpful (though accurate) judgment that there is "excessive"
regulation, they attempted to clog the administrative process with paperwork.
There is an institutional lesson from all this: Congress is not well-equipped
effectively to redesign the regulatory state. The executive branch, with its
cadre of experts in numerous substantive areas, is in a better position. For this
reason it may be best for Congress to limit its efforts to providing broad signals
about what is wrong and to allow the executive branch, within limits, to provide solutions. Statutes that permit or require economic incentives, and that
call for suitably constrained balancing, may be the best that Congress can do.
But there is a substantive lesson as well. If there is to be an Administrative
Substance Act, it should build on the foundation laid by recent learning about
regulatory performance. In the process it would be possible not only to save
billions of dollars unnecessarily wasted on current programs, but also to save
many thousands of lives.
A constitutional moment of the sort signaled by the 104th House of Representatives deserves far more reflection and scrutiny than the House itself was
willing to give it. And a cost-benefit state will have many questions to answer,
292. A good discussion appears in THOMAS 0. McGAiTY, REInVENTNG RATIONALrrY: Tim ROLE
OF REGULATORY ANALYsIs INTE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 165-75 (1991) (evaluating the regulatory
analysis conducted by various executive branch agencies). See also OFFCE OF POUCY ANALYsis, EPA,
REP. No. EPA/23012-871025a, UNFINSHED Busnwss: A CoMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENviRoNmENTAL PROBLEMS 94-100 (1987) (challenging the focus of EPA's regulatory priorities through a compari-

son of the risks associated with thirty-one major environmental problems).
293. See notes 59-70 supra and accompanying text.
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especially on underlying questions of valuation. I have suggested that a general
background requirement of cost-benefit balancing-a substantive supermandate-should be enacted. I have also suggested that this background rule
can and should be rejected through clearly expressed legislative judgments in
particular statutes. In describing costs and benefits, Congress should allow
room for a diverse array of values, and not limit agencies to the criterion of
private willingness to pay. Many statutes require or permit agencies to promote
goals independent of economic efficiency, and such statutes are entirely legitimate. Legislation that would amend all such statutes in favor of the efficiency
criterion would indeed be quasi-constitutional in nature. But in a well-functioning deliberative democracy, such legislation would be hard to defend on the
merits.
More modestly, an Administrative Substance Act, amending the regulatory
state, should include the background requirement I have described and also
require agencies to act in a cost-effective fashion. Congress should move as
well in the direction of requiring economic criteria where the underlying statute
is best understood as remedying a market failure, economically defined. A
cost-benefit state, understood in these terms, could make large improvements,
without embarking on foundational reform and without answering the hardest
questions, by offering initiatives that make sense under any reasonable theory
of value.
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